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FUNCTIONAL SECRECY
Laura K. Donohue*

The extent to which cloaking information advances the interests of democratic structures
varies according to which of three purposes it serves: protecting confidential deliberation,
preventing the release of factual information, or hindering access to law or legal processes. Its
legitimacy depends on the extent to which it alters political structures and the allocation of
power. This chapter, accordingly, offers a functional theory of secrecy, underscoring ways in
which U.S. practice has comported with, or departed from, democratic norms.
It begins by noting that in the early stages of decision-making, secrecy may carry certain
advantages. It can facilitate informed debate and allow individuals to change their views
without losing face or opening themselves to charges of duplicity, thus helping to ensure that
decisions are made on the merits. This is the domain of advice provided to the President, closed
Congressional hearings, and juror deliberations. Obscuring deliberations, though, risks
excluding information and stakeholders germane to the outcome. It thus requires broad
thinking beforehand to ensure that the relevant information and interests will be taken into
account. As the discussion approaches final resolution, moreover, the substance of the
exchange may become probative, if not dispositive, of the final rule, policy, or decision. The
impact of secrecy thereby moves from facilitating engagement to obfuscating the final
determination. As it does so, the quality of the limitation shifts from deliberative-secrecy to
information-secrecy or secret law, in which capacity it may undermine the effective operation
of a liberal, democratic state.
Information-secrecy masks factual data that the government obtains or generates. It
encompasses controls placed on material (e.g., classification, informal controls, and patent
secrecy orders) as well as restrictions on government employees. Secrecy functions in this
realm primarily to protect against threats to national security. Simultaneously, it may
undermine representative government, masking official behavior from the electorate. Absent
knowledge of how the executive wields its authority, moreover, neither facial nor as-applied
challenges may be brought to limit government overreach. Civil litigation also may be severely
constricted, resulting in the failure to rectify grievances. Public debate, civic engagement, and
justice may thereby be undermined. Structure, too, may change as the power of the executive
may expand vis-à-vis the other branches and citizens.
The last category centers on efforts to masque the law and legal processes. Static law,
working law, and interpretive law and legal processes all matter. Secrecy in each context
presents the most profound challenge to liberal democracy. It undermines the rule of law even
as it augments the power of agencies deep within the executive branch. It brings into question
the legality, and morality, of the rules themselves. Pari passu, adjudicatory secrecy masks the
administration of justice. This is the domain of in camera, ex parte proceedings, restrictions
on evidence, exclusion of the public from judicial proceedings, and attempted classification
by the Executive of judicial decisions. State secrets assertions may suspend litigation
altogether. This is a particularly insidious form of secrecy in a liberal, democratic regime—
one that risks fundamental reorganization of the constitutional structure.
The chapter explores the history of how the United States has treated secrecy in each of
these areas, noting the concerning trend toward greater secrecy. Growing Congressional
secrecy in the first category presents a particularly worrisome development, while increasingly
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aggressive Executive actions in the second category—particularly in regard to material
restrictions—does the same. The actions of all three branches in the third category present
perhaps the most profound challenge to the state. The chapter concludes by proposing that the
principal approach to drawing the line in each of these areas lies in considering the function
that secrecy plays, the structural impact of concealment, and the consequent impact of the
distribution of power among the political organs.
I. DELIBERATIVE SECRECY
The value of protecting deliberation from external view extends to antiquity. For Michel
Foucault, the Greek concept of parrhesia [παρρησία], or truth-telling, lay at the heart of
knowledge, power, and the self.1 As a matter of political interaction, parrhesia presented in
the course of democratic assembly and consultation with rulers. The latter often carried
substantial risk: monarchs unable to accept criticism or contrary opinions could (and did) kill
individuals for expressing their views.2 Nevertheless, for advisors to be effective, they had to
have the ability, and the courage, to tell the truth.3
The approach underscores twin goals: first is the importance of getting better ideas on the
table; second is the recognition that candor builds trust. Individuals may be more willing to
consider contrary arguments when they are put forward by individuals believed to be acting
in good faith. But there are other advantages as well. Protecting deliberations may help to
prevent outside parties and interest groups from exerting undue influence. Money and politics
can skew decisionmaking in favor of those with more power, potentially undermining coming
to a better conclusion. Secrecy allows individuals to play devil’s advocate, considering
alternative (and potentially unpopular) views, without being concerned about negative
publicity that may result from entertaining different ideas. Exploring alternative positions
assumedly enables decisionmakers to reach better results. Additionally, protecting the
deliberative sphere can create space for individuals to be persuaded by arguments that are put
forward and, thus, to change their positions. By not becoming publicly identified with a stance
on certain issues, decisionmakers may avoid the need to find a way to save face to reverse
course, facilitating a better outcome. This argument evokes a deeply humanistic principle: it
is only through full and frank discussion that one’s own ideas can evolve. Finally, as a
structural matter, protecting the deliberative process may help to maintain separation of
powers, allowing each branch to operate without interference from the other organs. This, in
turn, may help to protect against overreach, thereby protecting individual liberty.
Important drawbacks, however, also present. Deliberative secrecy may preclude outside
parties from contributing to the discussion with deleterious consequences for the quality of the
decision as well as the legitimacy of the final rule or decision. Critical expertise may be
ignored to the detriment of all. Where the discussion involves a negotiation, it may be harder
to get buy-in to the final agreement if key stakeholders are neither at the table nor allowed to
contribute in a meaningful way to the design. Voters may be confronted with merely a thumbsup or a thumbs-down option, instead of having the opportunity to shape the final product. The
less accessible decision-making is to the outside world, the more power those in the room
accrue. What is decided behind closed doors, moreover, may exceed the purview set for the
deliberative body. While this concern may be mitigated by requiring the final decision to be
1
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approved by an external arbiter, at that point, it may be too late to disentangle the various
elements of the agreement. Further, once a decision is reached, it may be difficult to ascertain
the intent behind the rule. While purposive arguments may be dismissed as non-conclusive, in
some circumstances, they can be probative of final meaning.
Contemporary deliberative political processes reflects the tensions inherent in deliberative
secrecy, seeking to extract value while mitigating accompanying risks. All three branches
create space within which counselors, lawmakers, and jurors can be forthright. Certain
Congressional hearings and private meetings between and among members of Congress
remain cloaked from public view, even as executive privilege marks advice provided to the
President. Juror deliberations are similarly privileged.
The systems that operate, however, are not binary. They recognize that discourse exists
along a continuum, with the point at which a decision is reached embodying the formal
construction or interpretation of the rule serving to guide behavior. At that point, the function
of secrecy shifts from deliberative secrecy to secret law (see discussion in Part 3, infra). To
the extent that what we might think of as proximate deliberation is relevant to understanding
the final determination, then it exists, in some sense, as integral to the final rule.
Accordingly, each branch recognizes the importance of airing proximate deliberations to
deepen public understanding. The Congressional Record publishes House and Senate debates.
Committees, by and large, publish their hearing transcripts. The Federal Register, in turn,
contains the notices of proposed rulemaking as well as tentative and final rules. Every final
rule adopted and published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) includes not just a
summary of the rule and the legal authority for its issuance, but also a summary of the rule’s
purpose and an analysis of public comments received. Executive Orders and Presidential
Proclamations (which, absent extraordinary circumstances, are published in the CFR) include
within them the authority under which they are issued as well as the reasoning leading to the
rule. Federal courts, in turn, look to explanatory sources such as James Madison’s notes from
the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers to shed light on Constitutional
provisions, or legislative histories to shape statutory interpretation. Appellate courts issue
opinions that include the grounds on which their final determinations are made. The reasoning
supporting the holding establishes binding precedent, even as extraneous reasoning—i.e.,
dicta—may be probative, if not dispositive, in subsequent cases.
The problem in the American context is that the evolution of deliberative privilege,
particularly in regard to the legislature, is towards greater secrecy, with deleterious
consequences for the structure of the state and representative government.
A. Legislative Privilege
The United States has a long history of protecting debate from public inspection, adopting
protective measures during the Constitutional Convention and then extending similar
protections to the legislature. Simultaneously, delegates underscored the importance of public
deliberation and participation in the democratic process. A certain equilibrium emerged. But
over the past few decades, Congressional secrecy has significantly increased, with an attendant
impact on public understanding of the law and the ability of citizens to hold the executive
accountable through the both the electoral process and the courts.
1. Constitutional Design
In May 1787, within days of meeting for the first time, delegates to what became the
Constitutional Convention agreed to protect their deliberations from the “licentious
publications of their proceedings” by vowing to keep them secret, masking their decision-
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making from those not present—including, and particularly, the press.4 The rule they adopted
forbade any duplication of journal entries. It also limited access to the journal only to members
present, and it established “That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise
published or communicated without leave.”5
James Madison, whose scrupulous notes of the Convention provide much food for fodder,
was one of the strongest proponents of secrecy. As he explained to Thomas Jefferson, it “was
thought expedient in order to secure unbiassed discussion within doors, and to prevent
misconceptions & misconstructions without, to establish some rules of caution which will for
no short time restrain even a confidential communication of our proceedings.”6 Jefferson did
not welcome the rule, lamenting to John Adams, “I am sorry they began their deliberations by
so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the tongues of their members. Nothing can justify
this example but the innocence of their intentions, & ignorance of the value of public
discussions.”7 Others similarly objected, but the decision had strong support among delegates.8
George Mason saw it as “a necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or mistakes;
there being a material difference between the appearance of a subject in its first crude and
undigested shape, and after it shall have been properly mature and arranged.”9 George
Washington noted in his diary, “Attending in Convention and nothing being suffered to
transpire no minutes of the proceedings has been, or will be inserted in this diary.”10
The primary reason for the rule was to ensure that delegates were at liberty to discuss
sensitive matters. Secrecy, Madison explained, would “secure the requisite freedom of
discussion,” even as it would also “save both the Convention and the community from a

James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention, Monday, May 28, 1787 (“Mr Butler moved that the
house provide . . . against licentious publications of their proceedings . . . Whereupon it was ordered that [the
motion] be referred to the consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the
Committee make report thereon.”). See also James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention, Tuesday,
May 29, 1787.
5 James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention, Tuesday, May 29, 1787 (noting the additional rules:
“That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House without leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal. That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise
published or communicated without leave.”). On July 25, 2787, the Convention approved a resolution to allow
the Committee of Detail access to copies of the proceedings so that they could carry out their responsibilities. On
the same day, a 6-5 vote went against allowing members of the Convention access to resolutions. JOHN R. VILE,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 693 (2005).
6 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 6, 1787.
7 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, Aug. 30, 1787.
8 See, e.g., Luther Martin to the State of Maryland, Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, Held
at Philadelphia, in 1787, Jan. 27, 1788 (“By another [rule], the doors were to be shut, and the whole proceedings
were to be kept secret; and so far did this rule extend that we were thoroughly prevented from corresponding with
gentlemen in the different states upon the subjects under our discussion – a circumstance, sir, which I confess I
greatly regretted. I had no idea that all the wisdom, integrity and virtue of this State or of others, were centred in
the Convention. I wished to have corresponded freely and confidentially with eminent characters in my own and
other states – not implicitly to be dictated by them, but to give their sentiments due weight and consideration. So
extremely solicitous were they that their proceedings should not transpire, that the members were prohibited even
from taking copies of resolutions on which the Convention were deliberating, or extracts of any kind from the
Journals, without formally moving for and obtain permission, by a vote of the Convention for that purpose.”).
9 George Mason to George Mason Jr., 1 June 1787, in RFC, 3:32-33.
10 1 June 1787, in DGW, 5:164. But see George Washington to George Augustine Washington, 3 June 1787 in
PGWCon, 5:219 (providing a broad overview of the discussions to his brother). See JOHN R. VILE, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 694 (“George Washington filled his diaries during his time with records
of the weather and where he dined, but he included no substantive facts about the Convention. Delegates
frequently cited the secrecy rule in corresponding with their friends. James Madison, the individual who kept the
most extensive and accurate notes of Convention proceedings, was the last delegate who attended the Convention
to die, and he specified that his notes would not be published until after his death.”); TONY WILLIAMS & STEPHEN
F. KNOTT, WASHINGTON AND HAMILTON: THE ALLIANCE THAT FORGED AMERICA 104-127 (2016); RICHARD
BEEMAN, PLAIN HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83-84 (2009).
4

4

thousand erroneous and perhaps mischievous reports.”11 Additional rationales supported a
certain amount of discretion—not least, the fact that while their formal purview was to amend
the Articles of Confederation, as a practical matter, the delegates created an entirely new
government.12
Privileged exchange had other benefits as well. It allowed those present to propose ideas
without fear of repercussion, encouraging more robust debate. It also prevented delegates from
becoming tied to their initial positions, allowing them to be influenced by argument and reason.
It protected the conversation from becoming unduly influenced by external groups. And it
cloaked sausage-making from outside scrutiny, leaving the final product to be inspected on its
own merits. Mason considered it “a necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or
mistakes; there being a material difference between the appearance of a subject in its first crude
and undigested shape, and after it shall have been properly matured and arranged.”13 Jared
Sparks, an early American historian, later related a conversation with Madison:
Opinions were so various and at first so crude that it was necessary they should
be long debated before any uniform system of opinion could be formed.
Meantime, the minds of the members were changing and much was to be gained
by a yielding and accommodating spirit. Had the members committed
themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency
required them to retain their ground, whereas by secret discussion, no man felt
himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their
propriety and truth and was open to argument. Mr. Madison thinks no
Constitution would ever have been adopted by the Convention if the debates
had been public.14
The nascent constitution went on to recognize the importance of both democratic
accountability and deliberative secrecy.15 The Journal Clause ensured public knowledge of
how representatives voted (at least in regard to the preferences of a minority on certain
matters). It reflected a presumption of transparency in regard to the chambers’ deliberations.
It afforded the Senate and House the authority to determine the timing of the release of the
information. And it retained for each chamber the discretion to waive public release of
information. At the same time, it fell short of creating a universal right of physical access.
A few points deserve notice. While a majority, assumedly, could block access to
deliberations, the Roll Call Clause ensured that just one-fifth of the membership could require
publication of how representatives voted—a constitutional minimum for accountability. This
design created a presumption of openness but allowed for each house to determine, on a caseby-case basis, the extent to which deliberative secrecy would be maintained. Ultimately, the

James Madison to James Monroe, June 10, 1787 (“One of the earliest rules established by the Convention
restrained the members from any disclosure whatever of its proceedings, a restraint which will not probably be
removed for some time. I think the rule was a prudent one not only as it will effectually secure the requisite
freedom of discussion, but as it will effectually secure the requisite freedom of discussion, but as it will save both
the Convention and the Community from a thousand erroneous and perhaps mischievous reports.”).
12 Articles of Confederation, Article XII (“Nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them;
unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the
legislatures of every State.”).
13 George Mason to George Mason, Jr., June 1, 1787.
14 Farrand III, 479.
15 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §5 “(Each house shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of
either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”).
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Madisonian check, in conjunction with federalist pushback from the state legislatures, would
help to demarcate the appropriate boundaries.16
Directly elected by the people and ceded the responsibility of raising revenue, the House
quickly adopted an open-door policy.17 The Senate, in contrast, initially followed the precedent
set by the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention: it met in secret and looked
down on the House for the populist displays that marked the public gallery.18 It gave its first
employee, the doorkeeper, strict instructions to prevent either the public or members of the
House of Representatives from gaining access to the chamber while the Senate was in
session.19
Pressure steadily increased on the Senate, though, to admit the public—particularly from
state legislatures, who had elected members of the chamber. In 1794, Democratic-Republicans
introduced a measure to allow for more openness.20 The proposed resolution cited the
responsibility that representatives had to their constituents and to their states to make “all
questions and debates” related to their legislative and judicial responsibilities public.21 North
Carolina’s Alexander Martin explained that withholding such information undermined
Senators’ accountability—the importance of which increased in proportion to the greater
powers afforded the chamber.22 Publicity would allow for “abuse of power [and] maladministration of office” to be “more easily detected and corrected”; it would prevent
“jealousies, rising in the public mind from secret Legislation”; and it would instill greater
confidence “in the National Government,” which was entrusted with securing and protecting
the “lives, liberties, and properties” of the People.23 Accordingly, the resolution called for “a
standing rule, that the doors of the Senate Chamber remain open while the Senate shall be
sitting in a Legislative and Judiciary capacity, except on such occasions as in their judgment
may require secrecy.”24
Although the resolution was postponed,25 a dispute over whether Pennsylvania’s senatorelect (Albert Gallatin) met the constitutional citizenship requirements for office afforded
Democratic-Republicans another opportunity to press for open proceedings. The Federalist
majority, keen to avoid the bad press that may well follow a closed-door decision,
acquiesced.26 Less than a fortnight later, the Senate agreed to open all of its deliberations to
the public “so long as the Senate shall be engaged in their Legislative capacity, unless in such
cases as may, in the opinion of the Senate, require secrecy.”27
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It was not until 1913 that the Seventeenth Amendment required the direct election of senators. Prior to that,
state legislatures played a central role.
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people”).
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21 Annals of Congress, Senate, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess, p. 33 (Jan. 16, 1794).
22 Id. at 33-34.
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id.
25 See also Annals of Congress, Jan. 17, 1794 at 34 (extending consideration of the Resolution until the following
Wednesday); Annals of Congress, Jan. 22, 1974 at 37 (extending consideration of the Resolution for a fortnight);
Annals of Congress, Feb. 5, 1794 at 40 (extending consideration of the Resolution for a fortnight); Annals of
Congress, Feb. 19, 1794 at 45-46 (voting to take up the main question in the next session of Congress).
26 Annals of Congress, Feb. 11, 1794 at 42-43 (Resolving “That the doors of the Senate be opened, and continue
open during the discussion upon the contested election of Albert Gallatin.”).
27 Annals of Congress, Feb. 20, 1794, at 47. The resolution, which passed 19-8, went into effect after the end of
the First Session “and so soon as suitable galleries shall be provided for the Senate Chamber.” Id.
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In addition to the Journal Clause, the Statement and Account Clause assumed
representatives’ public accountability.28 The provision retained a similar discretion, although
“all public Money” was to be included. The Constitution granted no discretion in terms of
what must be accounted for, even as it preserved a liberty for Congress to determine the
manner in which the information was presented and to keep its debates about how such money
should be spent private.
2. Evolution of Norms
Over time, the standard evolved for the Senate and House to hold most of their
deliberations in public, with special rules for exceptional circumstances. Professor Dakota
Rudesill, who has undertaken groundbreaking research on the evolution of secrecy in
Congress, observes that by 1800, open sessions were the default: “Thereafter the House and
Senate retained rules allowing for secret or closed sessions to consider confidential
information and presidential messages, treaties, and nominations,” but starting in the
nineteenth century, “non-public proceedings were generally rare.”29 The pattern was “open
full chamber sessions to debate and pass the law, with periodic full chamber closed sessions
and regular closed committee work to consider non-public information.”30
Reflecting this legacy, the rules of the House of Representatives provide for secret
sessions, “[w]hen confidential communications are received from the President, or when the
Speaker or a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner informs the House that such
individual has communications that such individual believes ought to be kept secret.”31 Since
the War of 1812, the House has only met secretly, as a whole, on half a dozen occasions.32
Almost every discussion involved matters of foreign affairs.
As in the House, the Standing Rules of the Senate allow for sessions to be closed for
legislative matters, as well as nominations and treaties.33 For the latter, they are presumptively
closed unless a majority decides otherwise (which it frequently does). The chamber requires
that impeachment trials be closed.34 Because the Senate has more explicit constitutional
foreign affairs authorities than the House, as well as the power of impeachment, the Senate
has met secretly considerably more times than its counterpart, but almost exclusively in
relation to the matters specified above.35
Although a presumption of openness accompanies Congressional deliberations, the
practice of closed committee hearings has increased commensurate with the growth of the
national security state and the establishment of its legislative counterparts. A certain amount
of secrecy may be seen as a concomitant necessity in light of new and emerging threats,
weapons, and technologies. Nevertheless, the democratic costs associated with cloaking
legislative deliberations raises significant concerns.
U.S. CONST., Art. I, §9 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.”).
29 Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 241, 254 (2015).
30 Id., at 255.
31 House of Representatives, Rule XVII (9).
32 See, e.g., Dec. 27, 1825 (relations with Indian tribes); May 27, 1830 (trade with Great Britain); June 20, 1979
(the Panama Canal); Feb. 25, 1980 (Cuban foreign relations); July 19, 1983 (U.S. relations with paramilitaries in
Nicaragua); and March 13, 2008 (FISA).
33 Standing Senate Rules XXI, XXIX, and XXXI.
34 Senate Rules for Impeachment Trials, Rules XX and XXIV.
35 See, e.g., impeachment proceedings (May 24, 1933; Apr. 15-16 1936; Oct. 7-9 1986; Mar. 16, 1989; Oct. 19,
1989; Nov. 2, 1989; Jan. 25-26 1999; and Dec. 7, 2010); foreign affairs matters include Jun. 7, 1971 (U.S.
involvement in Laos); Feb. 21-22, 1978 (Panama Canal); Apr. 26, 1983 (U.S. support for Contras); Feb. 1, 1984
(U.S.S.R. arms control compliance); Feb. 25, 1992 (MFN extension to China); Apr. 24, 1997 (Chemical
Weapons Convention); Dec. 20, 2010 (New Start Treaty).
28
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The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Committee
on Intelligence (HPSCI) routinely close their hearings and refuse to release even redacted
transcripts or summaries of the proceedings. The numbers are getting steadily worse. Outside
of nominations, during the 114th Congress, in 2016, SSCI shuttered nearly every hearing,
holding 48 secret sessions and only three open discussions.36 In other words, SSCI barred the
public from approximately 94% of its deliberations. The 115th Congress did little better: in
2017, there were only 10 open hearings and 75 closed ones, with the result that 88% of SSCI’s
hearings were closed to the public. The following year, the number of open hearings halved
to only five, with another 49 closed sessions—nearly 91% of the hearings being closed. The
trend got worse in the 116th Congress: in 2019, there was only 1 open hearing, in contrast to
53 closed ones, with the result that 98% of all of SSCI’s hearings were closed. In 2020, SSCI
again only had 1 open hearing, with 36 closed sessions. Ironically, the only open hearing
addressed: “Declassification Policy and Prospects for Reform”—which, apparently, are not so
good: the first few months of the 117th Congress witnessed just one open hearing in contrast
to 10 closed discussions.37
Like its Senate counterpart, the HPSCI conducts most of its hearings behind closed
doors.38 And it is not just the intelligence committees that are closing their hearings to the
public. The percentage of closed hearings, outside of nominations, for the Senate Armed
Services Committee is telling: from 24% of all hearings being closed to the public in 2017,
the percentage has increased every year: to 26% in 2018, 32% in 2019, and 37% in 2020.39
To the extent that what is at issue relates to free and open discussion removed from final
determination, the decision to close hearings may result in members being able to consider
measures more honestly and to ask hard questions. But in the process, public education on
such matters is lost. For SSCI, even the topics addressed by the committee are cloaked from
view. Instead, the public record merely reads: “Closed Briefing: Intelligence Matters”.
To the extent that these hearings, moreover, function as a form of public oversight, and
not merely discussion of how best to craft future legislation, it becomes nearly impossible to
hold Representatives responsible for how diligently they are performing their duties or
representing their constituents. No more can the public understand how the executive is
interpreting and implementing the law—or hold it responsible through either voting or
litigation. The cost is borne further in democratic engagement and potentially, once
information is finally aired, in the political legitimacy of institutions that have been operating
in unexpected ways outside the public gaze. To the extent that Congressional activity involves
oversight, moreover, the question of secrecy may leave the realm of deliberation and enter into
other categories: namely, data secrecy and masking the law. Here, as a normative matter, the
decision to block public access is based on much weaker grounds.
B. Executive Deliberation
Like the legislature, from the earliest days of the Republic, the executive has sought to
protect its deliberative processes. There are limits on what can be considered within this realm,
however, with implications for the conduct of civil and criminal litigation as well as the
structure of the state.
36

See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/.
Outside of nominations, from January 2021 through the end of March 2021, SSCI held 10 closed hearings as
compared to just one open hearing. See id.
38 In 2016, for instance, HPSCI held more than twice as many closed hearings as open ones (with nine hearings
closed and four open). U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
https://intelligence.house.gov/calendar/default.aspx?EventTypeID=215&Page=2. In 2017, it again held nine
closed hearings with just six hearings open to the public. Id.
39 See U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings.
37
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One of the first questions of executive privilege in the newly-constituted government arose
in the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison.40 Charles Lee, Marbury’s attorney, subpoenaed
Levi Lincoln, who, while acting Secretary of State, had been in the room with Thomas
Jefferson when they found the undelivered commissions. Jacob Wagner, Jefferson’s
temporary secretary (pending Meriwether Lewis’s arrival), had neglected to enter the
commissions into the record book, making Lincoln’s testimony critical.41 Lincoln, however,
refused to answer on grounds of executive privilege: he stated “that he was not bound, and
ought not to answer, as to any facts that came officially to his knowledge while acting as
secretary of state.”42
Once the questions were written and provided to him, Lincoln offered a rationale beyond
the mere provision of candid advice to the President. As reported by Cranch, “1st. He did not
think himself bound to disclose his official transactions while acting as secretary of state; and
2d. He ought not to be compelled to answer any thing which might tend to criminate
himself.”43 Lee argued in response that “the duties of a secretary of state were two-fold.” On
the one hand, he had a duty to act “as a public ministerial officer of the United States, totally
independent of the President.”44 In this capacity, “any facts which came officially to his
knowledge . . . he was as much bound to answer as a marshal, a collector, or any other
ministerial officer.” 45 In his second role, he acted as an agent of the President. Here, he was
“bound to obey his orders, and accountable to him for his conduct.”46 In this capacity, “any
facts which came officially to his knowledge . . . he was not bound to answer.”47 Lincoln
again objected, saying that “it was going a great way to say that every Secretary of State should
at all times be liable to be called upon to appear as a witness in a court of justice, and testify
to facts which came to his knowledge.”48 While he might have a duty to the court, he also had
a duty to the executive.
Chief Justice Marshall’s took the position that while deliberative secrecy was a valid
exercise of executive power, and the Fifth Amendment prevented self-incrimination, nothing
Lincoln had been asked to disclose could be considered confidential. To the contrary, it was
“a fact which all the world have a right to know.”49 Lincoln capitulated.50
The case underscored the distinction between factual information and confidential
political and legal discussions that lead to decision points. While the former fell outside of
executive privilege, the latter fell well within the long-recognized principle that full and frank
consideration of matters before the President required some level of private discretion. The
fact that Lincoln had seen that the commissions had been signed by the President John Adams
40

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
It appears that Wagner informed Jefferson about the commissions, prompting the President to remove acting
Secretary of State John Marshall and appoint Levi Lincoln in his place.
425 U.S. 1 Cranch 143 (1803) (“Mr. Lincoln, attorney general, having been summoned and now called, objected
to answering. . . . On the one hand he respected the jurisdiction of this court, and on the other he felt himself
bound to maintain the rights of the executive. He was acting as secretary of state at the time when this transaction
happened. He was of opinion, and his opinion was supported by that of others whom he highly respected, that he
was not bound, and ought not to answer, as to any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as
secretary of state.”).
43 5 U.S. 1 Cranch, 144 (1803).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. He was not required to answer anything that might incriminate himself, as protected by the Fifth
Amendment.
48 Id.
49 5 U.S. 1 Cranch, 144-145 (1803) (“If there had been he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that any
thing was communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was he obliged to state any
thing which would criminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions had been in the office or not,
could not be a confidential fact; it is a fact which all the world have a right to know.”)
50 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 145 (1803).
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and marked with the seal of the United States did not fall within executive privilege. Nor was
it beyond his purview to testify whether, to his knowledge, any of the commissions had
actually been delivered.
Reflecting this legacy, the Courts and Congress have repeatedly recognized the validity
and importance of executive privilege.51 While it is not to be invoked lightly, it is considered
essential to executive deliberation.52 It is for this reason that the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) includes an exemption for inter- or intra-agency memorandums or letters that contain
attorney work-product.53 The purpose is not to protect secrecy per se, but, more specifically,
the deliberative process.54 This includes a wide range of matters.55
Nevertheless, there are limits as to what falls within the deliberative process. In United
States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court determined that the President cannot appeal to executive
privilege as a shield against criminal prosecution.56 In the time that has since elapsed, as a
general rule, the courts tend to consider statements of facts as outside the privilege, while
opinions, recommendations, and advice provided within the Executive Branch within it. The
assertion is deeply context-dependent, so the courts treat each on a claim-by-claim basis.
Assuming that protection of the liberal, democratic government is the aim of the state, the
type of information at stake matters. As addressed in Parts 2 and 3, below, informationsecrecy, as well as deliberative secrecy that nears the final determination and is thereby
probative of the meaning of the final rule or determination, raises separate concerns that impact
separation of powers. To the extent that executive privilege impairs accountability (to the
public or to Congress), or the ability of the judiciary to fulfill its important constitutional
functions, it crosses an important boundary.
C. Judicial Matters
There are myriad ways in which the judiciary, too, recognizes the importance of
deliberative secrecy. Grand juries proceed behind closed doors to ensure the free flow of
discussion. Outside of narrow circumstances, grand jurors, interpreters, court reporters,
operators of recording devices, anyone transcribing recorded testimony, attorneys for the
government, and any other individuals to whom disclosure is made are forbidden from
disclosing any matter to come before the grand jury.57 Grand jurors’ votes can never be
disclosed.58 In both criminal and civil cases, petit juries do not undertake their discussions in
open court.
Nor is the public allowed to observe judges’ conferences at an appellate level. The
Supreme Court, too, meets behind closed doors and communications in chambers are protected
from public scrutiny. It is only where the decision approaches the establishment of law, in the
opinions themselves, that insight into the various competing considerations is made available.

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality); N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (stating as the ultimate purpose of
executive privilege ensuring the highest-quality agency decisions); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
52 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
53 See 5 U.S.C.A. §552(b)(5); Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. 1 (2001); F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc.,
462 U.S. 19 (1983); NRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, p. 10; S. Rep.
No. 813, p. 2.
54 532 U.S. 1.
55 See, e.g., U.S. v. Weber Aircraft Corp, 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
56 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. Rule 6(e)(2)(B). Exceptions are laid out in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)-(G).
58 Rule 6(e)(3)(A).
51
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In contrast to proceedings in chambers, while deliberative privilege protects certain
documents from discovery,59 although some exceptions apply (see CIPA discussion, infra),
documents submitted to the court are, for the most part, open. As a matter of deliberative
secrecy, that makes sense, as the parties in a case are not direct advisors to the judiciary.
Instead, they are interested entities pursuing certain claims. They therefore fall outside the
deliberative domain. As with the legislature and the executive, to the extent that secrecy
advances the interest of ensuring full discussion within the judiciary, such secrecy may well
support (instead of undermining) liberal, democratic values and facilitate fundamental
principles of fairness at issue in litigation. But, as addressed in Part 3, as the discussion
approaches a final judgment, the function of secrecy shifts to one that yields harmful results.
II. INFORMATION SECRECY
Another way in which secrecy may act within the legal system is to prevent certain types of
(factual) information from coming to light. A distinction can be drawn between such data and
what the Supreme Court terms “working law.” Although information-control systems may be
applied to both, the function that secrecy plays in regard to each is essentially different.60 This
section focuses on the former, considering two primary ways information in the United States
is hidden from public view: material controls and restrictions on government employees. Both
operate across all three branches of government.
While deliberative secrecy, as noted in Part 1 of this chapter, is increasingly marking
congressional debate and deliberations, it is in regard to the Executive Branch’s actions that
we see the greatest concerns arising about information secrecy. Over the past few decades, we
have witnessed ever more aggressive efforts to prevent citizens from having insight into how
the government is wielding its power. The impact is felt in the structure of the state as well as
the protection of individual rights.
A. Material Controls
The principal means by which the executive branch exercises control over information is
by limiting access to data that the government generates or holds. The concept of masking (at
least some) information from the public inheres in sovereignty. States will, from time to time,
need to keep certain information hidden to mitigate vulnerabilities.
It is with national security and foreign intelligence in mind that Congress, from the
beginning, expected and allowed for the executive to engage in expenditures outside the public
eye. In July 1790, the legislature passed An Act providing the means of intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations, authorizing the President to draw up to $40,000 annually
from the Treasury, “for the support of such persons as he shall commission to serve the United
States in foreign parts, and for the expense incident to the business in which they may be
employed.”61 Capping the annual salaries, Congress required that the President “account
specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his judgment may be made public,
and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify.”62 In
1793, the Second Congress went on to pass a law stating, “That in all cases, where any sum
or sums of money have issued, or shall hereafter issue, from the treasury, for the purposes of
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See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. 706(2)(A); 16 U.S.C.A. 1855(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 920 F.3d
855 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2019).
60 See discussion, infra, Part 3.
61 Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22 Stat. 128, vol. 1, at 128.
62 Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22 Stat. 128, vol. 1, at 128, §1.
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intercourse or treaty, with foreign nations,” the President would decide whether to release the
amounts assigned or to certify the total of such expenditures.63
These statutes acknowledged a sphere of secrecy. The executive, however, did not cabin
itself to expenditures. In the twentieth century, the government went on to adopt a
classification regime, to institute informal controls, and to take steps to prevent certain
scientific and technical knowledge from becoming public.
This section considers classified and controlled unclassified information and patent
secrecy orders, positing that, to the extent that they enable the executive to protect national
security, they further the interests of the state. But to the extent that they interfere with public
understanding of how the executive is wielding its constitutional and statutory authorities, or
how the executive impacts the separation and balance of powers, they impact the progress of
civil and criminal litigation as well as the state structure itself.
1. Classified and Controlled Unclassified Information
The current classification system arose prior to World War II.64 In 1946, it split into two
realms: National Security Information (NSI) as classified by executive order, and Restricted
Data (RD), as defined in the Atomic Energy Acts.
In the former category, nine primary executive orders and two subsidiary ones have been
introduced since that time to control the dissemination of NSI.65 Under Executive Order
13,256, which currently controls NSI, classification can only be applied to matters related to
(a) military plans, weapons systems and operations; (b) foreign governments; (c) intelligence
operations; (d) foreign relations; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters related to
national security; (f) nuclear materials or facilities; (g) critical infrastructure; or (h) weapons
of mass destruction.66 Not every member of the intelligence community (IC) has the authority
in the first instance to classify materials.67 Original classification authorities (OCAs) alone
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Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 299, vol. 2, at 299, 2 An Act to continue in force for a limited time, and to
amend the act intituled, “An act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations.” The Third Congress made an additional $1 million available to the President “to defray any expenses
which may be incurred, in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.” Act of Mar.
20, 1794, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 345, An act making further provisions for the expenses attending the intercourse of the
United States with foreign nations; and further to continue in force the act entitled “An act providing the means
of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.”, p. 345, §1. The law required that an account of the
expenditures be laid before Congress.
64 Exec. Order 8381, Mar. 22, 1940.
65 Exec. Order 8381 (Mar. 22, 1940) (Roosevelt); Exec. Order 10104 (Feb. 1, 1950) (Truman); Exec. Order
10290 (Sept. 24, 1951) (Truman); Exec. Order 10501 (Dec. 15, 1953) (Eisenhower); Exec. Order 10964 (1961)
(Kennedy)(amending Exec. Order 10501); Exec. Order 11652 (Mar. 8, 1972) (Nixon); Exec. Order 12065 (June
28, 1978) (Carter); Exec. Order 12356 (Apr. 2, 1982) (Reagan); Exec. Order 12958 (Apr. 17, 1995) (Clinton);
Exec. Order 13292 (Bush) (Amending Exec. Order 12958); Exec. Order 13526 (Dec. 29, 2009) (Obama). Note
that various other orders play a subsidiary role. See, e.g., Exec. Order 12829, as amended (National Industrial
Security Program); Exec. Order 13549 (Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local,
Tribal, and Private Sector Entities); Exec. Order 13556 (Nov. 4, 2010) (Controlled Unclassified Information);
Exec. Order 13587 (Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible
Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information).
66 Exec. Order 13256, §1.4.
67 The IC includes two independent agencies (the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central
Intelligence Agency), eight Department of Defense elements (the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NSA, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and each of the services’
intelligence components—the Army, Navy, Air force, and Marine Corps), and seven additional departments and
agencies (the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, the Department of
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of
Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security
Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the
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can do so. As of FY 2016, there were 2,215 OCAs (up from 2,199 in FY 2015), who made
nearly 40,000 original classification decisions.68 Another 55 million derivative classifications
followed—a number that underscores a frequently-voiced concern that the IC has a tendency
to overclassify information.69
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (and later 1954) classified nuclear discoveries from
birth—even if funded and carried out by private citizens.70 The statute continued the
comprehensive restrictions that had existed during the Manhattan project, labeling all
information concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the
production of special nuclear material, or the use of special nuclear material in the production
of energy RD.71 Starting in 1954, Congress added a new category of Formerly Restricted Data
(FRD)—i.e., classified information removed from RD designation following a Department of
Energy (DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) joint determination that it relates primarily to
atomic weapons and can be safeguarded similar to NSI.72
Outside of NSI and RD, an unclassified regime controls public access to government
information. In 2010, President Obama issued an executive order establishing Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI) as a replacement for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) and
other markings.73 CUI serves as a catch-all for matters related to citizens’ privacy, security,
proprietary business information, and law enforcement investigations.74 The specific types of
information included vary widely—ranging from agency data provided to law enforcement
for investigations, to military records provided to former service members to facilitate benefits
claims. It may include medical data central to responding to diseases and epidemics, or
demographic data helpful to researchers developing new technologies.
The impact of formal classification and CUI on civil and criminal litigation depends on
the type of data at stake. Preventing the public from knowing the identities of foreign spies,
the time at which a drug shipment is expected to cross the border, or the blueprints for
advanced missile systems does not appear to directly harm—or even influence—the conduct
of judicial processes. The fact that information has previously been classified, moreover, does
not necessarily retard prosecution. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) allows
for suits to move forward with special work-arounds to ensure that certain privileged
information can be used at trial and that defendants will have an opportunity to respond to the
Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Members of the
IC, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic.
68 Information Security Oversight Office 2016 Report to the President, p. 1,
https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2016-annual-report.pdf.
69 See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST (July 19,
2010), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/;
Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013); etc. But note that
part of the reason for this broad use of classification relates to the expansion in the types of activities conducted
by the intelligence agencies since 9/11 and the correspondingly large number of employees and extensive
resources being made available. Simultaneously, the proliferation of new technologies allows for the rapid
replication and derivative classification of data.
70 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-585, codified as amended at 60 Stat. 755, Aug. 1, 1946; Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. 83-703, codified as amended at 68 Stat. 919, Aug. 30, 1954.
71 AEA 1954, §11(y). See also Exec. Order 13526, §6.2(a) (acknowledging RD).
72 The alteration gave DOD a role in FRD declassification and allowed military personnel to access nuclear
information with DOD clearances. It also made it possible for industry to develop nuclear power.
73 Exec. Order 13,556, Nov. 4, 2010 (Controlled Unclassified Information). See also 32 CFR part 2002. SBU
incorporated designations such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), and
Critical Infrastructure Information (CII), which proliferated following the 9/11 attacks.
74 CUI applies to certain, approved categories and subcategories of information established by ISOO. The
executive branch provides general descriptions for each category, a basis for controls, special markings, and
guidance on training and handling procedures. See, e.g., Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled
Unclassified Information, NIST Special Publication 800-171A, June 2018; Information Security Oversight
Office, Controlled Unclassified Information: Implementation & Recommendations, Oct. 2017, at 4.
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charges levied against them.75 These suits can be challenged in terms of whether they actually
provide for sufficient discovery to mount a defense. The court is placed in the position of
determining whether secrecy is undermining the administration of justice.
Some ways in which classification works may prevent citizens from seeing how their
rights are being impacted. If, for instance, the NSA obtains information about pending
(ordinary) criminal activity through Section 702 incidental collection, and provides that
information to the Drug Enforcement Agency—which then uses parallel construction to obtain
the same evidence (thus masking the original use of foreign intelligence authorities)—then
criminal defendants will never have an opportunity to challenge the statutory provision.76
Even if the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopts a policy of informing defendants when
information “derived from” FISA provisions is being used, if it classifies the definition of
“derived from,” the cloak of secrecy is maintained. The criminal justice system relies on
defendants knowing how the information has been obtained; this is the whole point of the
notice requirement. It allows defendants to mount facial and as-applied claims, keeping the
exercise of prosecutorial power in check. Information secrecy therefore may undermine the
ability to mount such challenges.
It is not just in the criminal realm that we see the impact of classification. In 2017, New
York University Professor Paul Light undertook a study of the federal government, finding
that as of 2015, its true size was 9.1 million employees—a number that included civilian
employees, active-duty military personnel, and contract and grant employees.77 Individuals
in the last category made up more than 40 percent of the workforce.78 Masking information
about contractors’ activities via classification may have a significant impact on civil litigation
across a range of areas: employment, environmental damage, intellectual property, wrongful
death and personal injury, and the like.
A similar phenomenon marks contractor use of state secrets as an affirmative defense,
prompting U.S. intervention and dismissal of the suit at a pleadings stage.79 The numbers are
growing: between 2001 and 2009, the government asserted state secrets in more than one
hundred cases, even as the doctrine’s shadow fell over dozens of others.80 Since then, there
have been more than 200 cases involving claims that the suit cannot continue without revealing
sensitive information.81
The doctrine has blocked complaints related to breach of contract, patents, trade secrets,
fraud, and employment termination.82 It has prevented wrongful death, personal injury, and
negligence suits from moving forward, as well as cases brought against telecommunications
75

Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, codified at 18 U.S.C. Appendix §§1-16.
Foreign Intelligence Surveilance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, §702.
77 Paul C. Light, The True Size of Government, Issue Paper, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, 2017,
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20Govern
ment.pdf.
78 Id.
79
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) (Dismissal of a libel action brought
following publication of an article in Penthouse Magazine on the Pentagon and CIA’s use of animals for military
and intelligence purposes. The U.S. Navy moved to intervene on the grounds that the case risked exposing
classified information.); Bareford v. General Dynamics Corporation, 973 F.2d 1138 (1992) (dismissing a case
brought against a contractor claiming a manufacturing and design defect in relation to the Phalanx weapons
system); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (government intervening and
invoking the state secrets privilege over 26,000 documents); United States ex. Rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc, 211
F.R.D. 388 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (suit over wrongful termination dismissed after the government intervened to assert
state secrets).
80 Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77-216 (2010).
81 See Georgetown Law State Secrets Archive, maintained by Laura K. Donohue and the Georgetown Law Center
on National Security and the Law, http://apps.law.georgetown.edu/state-secrets-archive/ (visited May 22, 2019).
82 Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77-216 (2010). In the criminal context as
well, Executive branch claims of secrecy have prevailed. Id.
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companies for acting outside the law; torture suits; environmental degradation claims; breach
of contract suits; and defamation litigation.83 The privilege has become a sort of private
indemnity, excusing contractors from various forms of malfeasance. The executive also
benefits from state secrets privilege, which masks how it uses its power.84
In addition to the immediate impact on litigation, classification has a potentially broader
impact on the legal system. From a separation of powers perspective, the legislature is
entrusted with oversight—a function it cannot perform if the executive branch can simply hide
information from it. The Senate and House, accordingly, retain the right to declassify material,
even over Presidential objection.85 The same is true of the committees that most often handle
classified materials. SSCI, for instance, controls access to its own records.86 Members of the
committee may declassify witness names and make classified materials available to the rest of
the Senate or to the public.87 HPSCI also has its own system for safeguarding sensitive
information.88 As soon as information is obtained, it becomes committee material.89 The
committee then controls who has access to it—including whether and when to make it entirely
public.90
As a constitutional matter, the executive orders that govern formal and informal controls
on executive branch materials cannot be used to prevent the other two branches from airing or
publishing their work for the simple reason that they are separate, co-equal branches. One
would think that this point does not even need to be addressed, if it were not for the
Government’s recent contention to FISC that the executive alone can decide when and what
portions of judicial opinions can reach the light of day. This claim runs directly contrary to the
concept of separation of powers. When one branch of government attempts to classify the
product of another branch, moreover, the type of secrecy at play subtly shifts: information
secrecy morphs into efforts to mask the law itself, which, as Part 3 addresses, is the most
dangerous kind of secrecy in a liberal, democratic regime.
2. Patent Secrecy Orders
Patent secrecy orders also act to restrict public access to information, making it
particularly difficult for inventors to recoup damages or to mount effective constitutional as-
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Id.
In Restis v. United Against Nuclear Iran, for instance, a Greek citizen, Victor Restis, who owns and manages
Enterprises Shipping and Trading, complained that United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and its CEO Mark
Wallace (a former representative of the U.S Mission to the United Nations) had engaged in defamation and
various other torts. Victor Restis v. American Coalition against Nuclear Iran, Case No. 13-cv-5032 (2013),
Amended Complaint for Defamation and other Tort Claims, ¶1, ¶3; ¶103 ff (defamation), ¶112 ff (tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage); ¶119 ff (tortious interference with contract); ¶125 ff
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); ¶132 ff (negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage); ¶138 ff (prima facie tort against all defendants). He accused them of using press releases, letters to
government officials, advertisements, Facebook postings, and Tweets to prevent private entities from providing
support to Iran. Victor Restis v. American Coalition against Nuclear Iran, Case No. 13-cv-5032 (2013), Amended
Complaint for Defamation and other Tort Claims, ¶4; ¶6. It did not specify the nature of the information at stake,
contending that neither could any information related to the suit safely be made public, nor could Plaintiffs’
counsel be given access (e.g., through a CIPA-like clearance procedure). Govt. Opp. Mem. L. 2. In March 2015,
the court dismissed the suit, with the result that the government never had to account for the accusations against
it. Restis v. United Against Nuclear Iran, 1:13-cv-05032 (Mar. 23, 2015) (2d Cir.)
85 S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a), (b)(1)-(5) (1976); Rules of House of Representatives, 115th Cong., Rule
X(g)(1) (2017).
86 S. Res. 400 §10.
87 SSCI R.P., 115th Cong., Rules 8.10, 9.5, 9.7; S. Res. 400, § 8(a).
88 HPSCI R.P., 115th Cong., Rules 12(a)-(b), 14.
89 Id. at Rule 13 (labelling it “executive session material”).
90 Id. at Rule 14(d), (f), (g), (i), (l); House Rule X(11)(g).
84
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applied challenges. Like the classification regime, such restrictions date back to the midtwentieth century.
The 1951 Invention Secrecy Act empowers the Commissioner of Patents to order that an
invention be kept secret, neither published nor patented, where such disclosure “might . . . be
detrimental to the national security.”91 The government does not have to have an interest in
adopting the invention.92 It merely must conclude that the invention may harm U.S. national
security. Once the commissioner institutes an order, it becomes a criminal offense to tell
anyone about the invention without authorization. The statute allows inventors to seek
compensation, but neither the order’s existence nor speculative damage are sufficient to
support compensation claims.93 The inventor must provide concrete evidence to demonstrate
actual damage.94
The number of secrecy orders is steadily increasing. In 2012, there were 5,327 orders in
place.95 In 2015, there were 5,579.96 This trend continued: by the end of FY 2018 (September
30, 2018), 5,792 orders were in effect—the highest number in decades.97 Although many of
the orders apply to inventions developed with government assistance, a significant number are
placed on independent inventors, who neither work with, nor are funded by, the United States.
In 2016, for instance, of the 121 new secrecy orders, 49 applied to private inventors.98
Despite the issues raised by these secrecy orders for First Amendment speech rights and
Fifth Amendment takings prohibitions, few legal challenges have come forward to determine
the constitutionality of the statute, and none have succeeded.99 It is difficult to establish
damages claims when a patent has not been granted. The first time the Court addressed this
question was in 1982.100 In response to James Constant’s assertion that the secrecy order
prevented him from marketing the invention, the Court stated:
These conjectural and speculative claims must be rejected in toto. Apart from
plaintiff’s own conclusory ipse dixit testimony, the record is devoid of any
probative evidence tending to show that the companies alleged to be potential
“customers” were interested in plaintiff’s unsolicited proposals, or that the
secrecy orders interfered with plaintiff’s attempts to sell his system to these
various companies.101
The burden was on the inventor to petition the Commissioner of Patents to modify the secrecy
order and allow him to market the invention.
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Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3, Feb. 1, 1952, 35 U.S.C. §181.
Hornback v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 552, 554 (1996).
93 Weiss v. United States, 146 F.Supp.3d 113, 127 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 37 F.App’x. 518 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
94 Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl.
663, 665 (1980).
95 Invention Secrecy Activity as reported by the Patent & Trademark Office, Federation of American Scientists,
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99 But see Hornback v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 552, 554 (1996); Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 244
(Ct. Cl. 1980) [hereinafter “Constant I”]; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 663, 665 (1980);
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100 Constant I, 223 Ct. Cl. 148; Constant v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 600 (1982) [hereinafter “Constant II”]. See
also Linick v. United States, citing to Constant I and II.
101 Constant I.
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Constant I, as it has come to be called, is a remarkable decision not least because inventors
have no access to the commissioner’s rationale and hence cannot use this rationale to challenge
the designation.102 In a classified domain, evidence of whether the invention actually harms
national security—or has been usurped by the government for its own use—is difficult to
obtain.103 The courts, moreover, have interpreted the statute narrowly, insofar as damages can
be awarded. The claim must arise from placement of the order, or because the government
uses the invention improperly (demonstration of which, in light of the potential use of
classification, may be extremely difficult to obtain).104 Courts exclude nonmonetary damages
and, at times, interest.105 Full-time USG employees may not seek damages.106 In addition,
courts reject efforts to recoup attorneys’ fees, making even successful litigation more costly.107
One of the most recent cases, in 2014, was brought for failure to compensate inventors for a
John/Jane Doe order placed on their invention, unjust enrichment, as well as for the
constitutional failings of the statute.108 The invention in question related to an improved
countermeasure for aircraft being attacked by infrared heat-seeking missiles.109 Once again,
the claim failed—this time, because the order had been lifted in the interim, making the case
moot.
B. Employee Controls
The second way in which the government may conceal information is by restricting
government employees’ ability to speak. A variety of devices can be used in this manner, such
as the security clearance process, employment contracts, termination agreements, statutory
provisions, and statutory exceptions. Such restrictions can prevent insight into the executive
branch; ensure that there is no one to dispute official reports; result in a power imbalance visà-vis current and former employees, citizens, other agencies, and the legislature; erode First
102
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Amendment rights; reduce the amount and quality of evidence presented in court; and
dehumanize the bureaucracy by taking individual personalities out of the equation. Each has
implications for the legal system.
In 2014, OMB reported that 5.1 million individuals (employees and contractors) held
security clearances.110 As a condition, every single one was required to sign documents
acknowledging that they would have access to sensitive information and accepting the
consequences, such as administrative censure or the possibility of losing employment for
failing to keep the information secret, and a lifetime of pre-publication review.111 Statutory
provisions provide further control. Federal law makes it illegal to disclose classified
information.112 Under the 1917 Espionage Act, it is illegal to gather, transmit, or lose defense
information, to deliver it to aid foreign governments, or to harbor anyone who has engaged in
either of the foregoing acts.113 The law forbids photographing, sketching, or selling pictures
of defense installations.114 Other statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, provide
explicit exceptions to prevent government information from reaching the public domain.
Speech control affects the legal system in numerous ways. As with the classification of
materials, it can prevent critical insight into the executive branch, making it difficult to
determine when the government is acting according to the law. Fewer as-applied challenges
may result. And it may prevent facial challenges from ever being raised. Although efforts to
offset these consequences have been established through various whistleblower processes,
they often prove ineffective.
Unless employees speak out, classification may prevent even gross violations of the law
from coming to light. The discussion of the enhanced interrogation techniques relied
extensively on government workers coming forward.115 The social and legal barriers to making
such information public may be substantial: individuals must decide to break ranks with their
agencies—a proposition difficult enough when procedures for reporting certain behavior have
been established. The decision may be compounded when classified documents have
determined that the behavior in question comports with doctrine, as it did in relation to the
NSA’s use of section 215 to collect telephony metadata. Preventing employees from speaking
on matters about which they are well-informed ends up harming the public democratic debate
surrounding certain authorities. Even where employees may not reveal classified data, part of
the importance of letting them participate in the debate rests on their insights—wisdom
developed because of their close familiarity with how the law operates.
When employees’ speech is tightly controlled, there is no one to counter the “official”
position put forward by policymakers. Nor is there anyone with direct knowledge of programs
and operations who can question the “lessons learned” for future policy decisions. Outside the
public eye, there is no public pressure on the bureaucracy to act in a certain way, nor pressure
from the bureaucracy on those making the decisions. Consequently, the public dialogue—and
strength of the law—suffers. So when Vice President Dick Cheney states that interrogation
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works,116 or senior IC officials say that torture led to actionable intelligence,117 the public is
not in a strong position to counter them in light of all potentially available evidence. It is an
assertion based on experience. By preventing others with the same experience (or with more
experience, because of their placement in the bureaucracy) from commenting, restrictions on
government employees allow assertions to go unchallenged.
Further distortion that occurs when only those who agree with top policymakers are
allowed to contribute to the conversation. There is evidence to suggest, for instance, that prepublication review is only enforced against those critical of government.118 As one scholar
has explained, “[D]isputes over redactions in a work favorable to an agency are almost
nonexistent,” with only one case on record.119
Another consideration relates to power. Karl Marx, Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and
others critiqued secrecy because of its intimate connection with disproportionate power. Marx
argued that bureaucracy “is a magic circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is the
hierarchy of knowledge.”120 In the search for power, control of information proves
paramount.121 Weber saw the bureaucratic state as the quintessential surveillance entity
wherein access to, and control of, information provides those in power with the “mechanisms
of repression.”122 Secrecy, “the things one declines to say or is forbidden to name,” presents
less of an “absolute limit of discourse” and more of an element that functions alongside power:
“There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie
and permeate discourse.”123
By preventing employees from speaking and/or contributing (freely) to the discourse, the
government is more able to control the information and thus build its power. When prepublication review boards place conditions on authors that extend beyond merely reviewing
the text that has been submitted, they abuse the employer-employee relationship.124 It is
equally inappropriate for review boards to circulate authors’ drafts within classified circles, or
for prosecutors unrelated to the review boards to then use the documents for their own
purposes.125 It is a further abuse of power to hold authors’ publications hostage to competing
agency interests, such as trying to prevent answering FOIA requests and, therefore, not
allowing even unclassified information into the public domain.126 Power considerations extend
beyond the disparate power held over society or employees, as, notably, the control of
information is concentrated in a small portion of the executive branch. So when Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees are prevented from discussing false charges brought
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against SSCI staff members in the midst of the committee’s enquiry into torture, the agency
increases its power over the legislature.127
A further concern is that allowing the government to quell employees’ speech erodes
important Constitutional protections. Rights suffer. The First Amendment is not by any means
unlimited.128 When the issue is critique of government action in relation to “matters of public
concern,” the Court weighs the employee’s interests against the interests of the State.129 Where
it is not a matter of public concern, the Courts grant wider latitude to the executive.130 The
problem with this balancing test is twofold: first, national security is a particularly strong
government interest, making allowance of employee speech in the most highly guarded sphere
of the state the least likely to pass judicial muster. Second, deference tends to reach into the
deliberative privilege, confusing the distinction between the two.
In 2015, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Oona Hathaway published an op-ed in the
Washington Post, underscoring the myriad problems with pre-publication review.131 Not only
do the criteria go beyond what is required to identify and protect classified information, but
reviewers can broadly interpret their mandates, leading to a chilling effect. In the interim, the
review process takes longer than indicated, leaving authors with no recourse.132 The risk is
that reviewers, by being selective about what they do or do not allow, and how long they delay
publication (e.g., until just after a Congressional vote), can shape the dialogue according to
their political interests.
An additional impact on the judicial system has to do with evidence presented in Court.
Pre-publication review means that not only are printed materials (from which attorneys could
draw their arguments) unavailable, but live testimony and witness representation are also
affected. Justice may be denied, because of the absence of corroborative or exculpatory
information, even as the role of the judiciary diminished.
Courts consider pre-publication review to be constitutional. In the first case to reach the
courts, United States v. Marchetti, an employee signed two secrecy agreements: one when he
joined the CIA and another when he left it.133 He went on to publish a novel and a number of
articles, prompting the agency to seek an injunction. The District Court ruled that Marchetti
had to submit anything related to his classified work at the agency at least thirty days prior to
publication. In light of the 1947 National Security Act requirement that the CIA protect its
sources and methods, the Fourth Circuit found that “a system of prior restraint against
disclosure by employees and former employees of classified info obtained during the course
of employment” was reasonable.134 What was unreasonable was the exit contract, which
prevented publication of even unclassified information.
The problem with the Court’s standard can be summed up in the legal principle of nemo
iudex in causa sua. By classifying more information—a decision that unreviewable by any but
the OCA—the CIA can expand its power to prevent almost anything from coming to light.
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The Court only partially addressed this concern, noting that if information was already “in the
public domain,” then Marchetti could republish it. But even this theory has been roundly
attacked by executive branch on the grounds that allowing such publication could confirm
potentially classified material. The Court added two requirements: the CIA had an obligation
to “act promptly to approve or disapprove any material” and, in the event that the author
disagreed with the pre-publication decision, he could seek judicial review.135 But such review
explicitly excluded the original classification decision.
Several years after Marchetti, Snepp v. United States reached the Court.136 Frank Snepp
published a book based on his eight years’ service with CIA. Upon leaving the agency, he,
too, agreed not to publish any information (either classified or unclassified) about the agency
or intelligence collection without obtaining prior approval. The Court decided that Snepp had
been in a position with “an extremely high degree of trust.” Therefore, it did not matter
whether his book contained classified information or not. Its publication could cause
irreparable harm. A scholarly debate ensued. Congress urged the executive branch to allow
former employees to speak.137 President Reagan did the opposite: National Security Decision
Directive 84 required pre-publication review for all individuals with SCI clearances.138
Congress balked.139 Reagan did suspend the lifetime pre-publication review requirement,140
but it had little impact, because individuals still had to sign other agreements that had the same
effect, in order to gain access to SCI.141 Pre-publication review became standard procedure.142
A final consideration in the government’s effort to stifle employee speech centers on the
way in which it dehumanizes government. When all that is allowed into the public domain are
policy statements and broad, sweeping generalizations from top officials, important details
remain hidden. Individuals lower down the ladder can often provide more accurate
information.143
III. SECRET LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES
The most dangerous form of secrecy in a liberal, democratic state relates to secret law (i.e.,
rules requiring obedience) and legal processes. Three types of laws come to the fore. Static
law, primarily consisting of statutes, differs in important respects from working law, which
puts the law into practice, and interpretive law, which determines whether an executive action
135
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comports with either the legislative framing or the dictates of the constitution. To the extent
that secrecy prevents such decisions and rules in each category from entering the public
domain, it presents a profound challenge to the legitimacy of the legal system.
Equally antithetical to liberal democracy and the constitutional structure of the United
States is the effort to masque legal process. Some forms of secrecy that operate in the judicial
realm, such as deliberative secrecy (e.g., in grand and petit jury discussions) and information
secrecy (e.g., in suppression of factual information at trial), we have already discussed.
Adjudicatory secrecy, in contrast, presents in the context of areas such as spectator exclusion
or in camera, ex parte hearings. Adjudicatory secrecy also marks certain quasi-judicial
functions assumed by the executive that have a direct impact on citizens rights. As with secret
law, preventing the public from access in this area presents a particularly strong challenge to
the foundation of liberal, democratic government.
A. Static Law
Static law incorporates legislative products, amongst which classified transcripts, annexes,
reports, appendices, appropriations, and supplements increasingly obfuscate the law.144
Rudesill details how these forms of secrecy present in a Congressional context, where secret
law in the national security realm is increasingly becoming the norm.
As Rudesill explains, since 1979, SSCI and HPSCI have overseen the annual Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA).145 This legislation, which governs the National Intelligence
Program, typically has a short section of Public Law text giving legal force to a detailed
classified addendum.146 The same year that the intelligence committees began legislating via
classified addenda in the IAA, the Appropriations Committees started writing classified
annexes and referencing them in the unclassified reports associated with the annual DOD
Appropriations Act (DODAA).147 This statute provides funding for DOD activities ranging
from operations related to the Global War on Terrorism and drug-interdiction and counterdrug activities, to military operation and maintenance and research and development.148 Since
1983, the Armed Services Committees have also attached classified addenda to the the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which provides the framework for the Defense
Department.149 Starting with fiscal year 1990 the Public Law text of the NDAA began giving
legal force to the classified addenda, with the DODAA following suit the subsequent year.150
Proponents of these devices argue that are the only way to regulate sensitive national
security programs.151 But by making them secret, Congress has consistently prevented the
public from understanding the letter of the law as well as the structure and scope of the national
security infrastructure.
It could be argued in response that classified addenda are mere commentary and not
technically part of a statute. As a constitutional matter, they do not undergo bicameralism and
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presentment.152 The President may not even have access to the classified addenda. Yet
Congress and the executive branch agree that the Public Law provisions referencing provisions
in the classified addenda do give those classified provisions legal force.153 In five of the seven
years prior to Rudesill’s analysis, the NDAAs included explicit incorporation language.154
DOD Appropriations Acts prohibit the agency from moving money among the accounts in a
manner that departs from the allocations in the classified addenda.155
Reports that accompany the bills for signature in the Oval Office, moreover, takes a similar
stance: of 32 IAAs since 1979, most have been accompanied by unclassified last-in-time
reports which emphasize that the classified Schedule should be considered part of the statutory
text, or that the annex should be considered part of the authoritative document.156 Courts, for
their part, look to legislative history to understand the intent behind the introduction of statutes
to probe the full meaning of the written text.157
Congress defends the practice by citing to the fact that it has passed clandestine measures
on numerous occasions—apparently unaware that it is establishing its own form of stare
decisis, wherein repetition carries with it its own legitimacy—rather underscoring the concern
that Congress is creating secret law.158 In the meantime, the number of classified annexes
appears to be increasing.159
While the above examples focus on intelligence programs, they are not the only area in
which Congress has introduced secret law.160 To the extent that the NDAAs and DOD
Appropriations Acts incorporate the Classified Annexes into Public Law, and not just the
Classified Schedule of Appropriations (or Authorizations), the realm of secret law is even
broader. As Rudesill notes, these annexes establish what the government must and cannot do,
with unknown and potentially broad implications for public policy and individual liberties.161
They bind the government and fund and govern classified activities—from NSA’s surveillance
apparatus to lethal drone programs, which plainly do, or could, implicate basic freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution.
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B. Working Law
Working law refers to authoritative executive branch interpretations and understandings
of their statutory and constitutional powers (as well as those of the other branches).162 It differs
from deliberation in that it represents a final decision point that then becomes binding.
Presidential orders, regulations, opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and
internal agency guidelines provide just a few examples of areas in which secret working law
may present.163
In 1935, Congress created the Federal Register. Statutory law requires publication of all
“Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except those not having general
applicability and legal effect or effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their
capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof.”164 Congress and the President have the
authority to add additional matters for publication.165 Any document or order that carries a
penalty is deemed to be of general applicability and legal effect.166
At the close of each year, everything published in the Federal Register is placed in Title 3
of the Code of Federal Regulations. In the event of “an attack or threatened attack upon the
continental United States,” if the President determines that publication “would not serve to
give appropriate notice to the public of the contents or documents,” she may suspend any part
of the publication requirement.167
Not every document that the President signs and has legal effect must be published.168
Many Executive Orders issued through the National Security Council remain classified. There
are also oral presidential directives, which are equally binding. Presidents distinguish between
“decision directives” and “review directives,” providing each with a different abbreviation.169
Despite the clandestine nature of many of these documents, the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) has “consistently advised” the President that they are controlling.170
It would be difficult to find a better example of working law than the legal opinions issued
by OLC. They contain independent legal analysis that is considered binding on the executive
branch.171 OLC’s “Best Practices” documents emphasize the importance of stare decisis:
outside of extraordinary circumstances, future opinions must conform to earlier ones, unless
the prior opinion has been withdrawn.172 The agency at times insulates its opinions, however,
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from public view, with the result that a secret jurisprudence now operates within the executive
branch.173
FOIA requires federal agencies to publish “substantive rules of general applicability
adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency”.174 A person “may not in any manner be
required to resort to, or be adversely affected by” a rule that should have been published in the
Federal Register but was not.175 Each agency must further “make available for public
inspection” (in electronic format) all “final opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases.”176 They also must make
available “those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agency and are not published in the Federal Register.”177
Despite the presumption of openness, under FOIA, certain information held by the
executive is not subject to disclosure. This includes “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes,” but only insofar as their production could reasonably be expected to
either (a) interfere with law enforcement proceedings, or (b) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.178 The statute also excludes matters that are “specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and [] are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order.”179 The burden is on the agency to demonstrate that an exemption applies.180

Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for
OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 n.* (Jul. 16, 2010). See also Confirmation Hearings on Federal
Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 766 (2005) (written responses of
Steven Bradbury, nominee to the position of Assistant Attorney General for OLC, to questions from Senator
Leahy) (“The [Guidelines] generally reflect operating principles that have long guided OLC in both Republican
and Democratic administrations.”), quoted and cited in Morrison, supra note 171, at n. 13-15.
173 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t
of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. § 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002),
http:washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf; superseded by,
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of
Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340–
2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), http://usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to the Attorney General (Nov. 2,
2001), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2011/03/25/johnyoomemo-for-ag.pdf; Memorandum
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Daniel
J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to
Military Detention of United States Citizens (June 27, 2002), Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert J.
Delahunty, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President &
William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Authority for Use of Military Force to
Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001). See also Dawn E. Johnsen et al., Guidelines
for the President’s Legal Advisors, 81 IND. L. J. 1345 (2006). Often, deliberative process protections are claimed
to prevent the memos from being provided. Yet some of the memos that have come to light raise disturbing
questions in regard to torture, the use of coercive interrogation methods, military detention of U.S. citizens, broad
intelligence collection, and the targeting of U.S. citizens—all outside legislative or judicial eyesight.
174 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(D).
175 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(E)
176 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2)(A).
177 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2)(B).
178 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C).
179 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)(A).
180 Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); Elec. Frontier
Found. V. Dep’t of Justice, 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.2014); Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington,
No. 12-5223, Apr. 1, 2014. See also Jaffer & Kaufman.

25

In NLRLB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a unanimous Supreme Court understood FOIA to
require all federal agencies to publish their “working law.”181 The Court pointed to the reading
room provision as representing “a strong congressional aversion to ‘secret law’” as well as “an
affirmative congressional purpose to require disclosure of documents which have ‘the force
and effect of law.’”182 While pre-decisional or deliberative documents may be withheld under
FOIA exemption five, the final decisions must be released.183
The DOJ argues that OLC can never generate working law—a claim at odds with its
assertion that OLC opinions are binding.184 If they are binding, they have the force of law. In
some cases, such as the Terrorism Surveillance Program or the use of enhanced interrogation,
it is only OLC analysis that undergirds programs. In 2016, Congress contemplated legislation
that would have required the executive to release legal opinions that reflected “controlling
interpretations of law.”185 It also would have required release of any “final reports or
memoranda created by an entity other than the agency” making final decisions, as well as
“guidance documents.”186 Congress did not pass the measure, however, opting instead to pass
a FOIA reform bill.187 FOIA requests prove inadequate to unearth OLC opinions, despite the
statute’s goal of eliminating secret law.188
C. Interpretive Law
Interpretive law incorporates judicial decision-making, where secrecy operates to masque
statutory construction, constitutional analysis, and government malfeasance, raising
constitutional concerns. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) provides a good
example of both interpretive law withheld from public inspection and the deleterious
consequences of doing so.
In 1978, Congress introduced FISC, and the appellate Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR) to consider whether the government had demonstrated probable
cause that an individual was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the
individual would use the facilities to be placed under surveillance, prior to issuing an order for
electronic surveillance. Congress did not anticipate that the FISC and FISCR would issue
precedential opinions involving complex matters of statutory construction and constitutional
interpretation. There are now nearly 90 declassified and redacted FISC/FISCR opinions and
181
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300 orders in the public domain. They address matters that have a profound impact on
individual rights. The failure to provide this information in a public context undermines
democratic government.
The Section 215 telephony metadata program provides an excellent example. For years,
the government’s contention, and court’s acceptance, that language in the USA PATRIOT Act
could be read broadly to authorize the collection of nearly all Americans’ telephony metadata,
remained secret. In 2013, when the secret legal interpretation emerged, the public outcry shook
all three branches. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which had
floundered since its creation, took form and issued its first report, in which it found that the
government had engaged in illegal surveillance.189 The body called for the immediate
cessation of the program. President Obama appointed the Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, which sharply criticized the statutory interpretation and
calling for an end to the program.190 He went on to issue PPD-28 to try to restore domestic and
international confidence in the U.S. intelligence community.191
In the courts, numerous cases challenged the program. The Second Circuit called the
statutory interpretation “unprecedented and unwarranted” and ruled that it violated the act.192
In Klayman v. NSA, Judge Leon granted an injunction against the NSA, calling the program
“Almost Orwellian” and “almost certainly unconstitutional.”193FOIA requests and suits
suddenly exploded: in one, the Electronic Frontier Foundation requested “all decisions, orders,
or opinions issued by FISC or FISCR between 1978 and June 1, 2015, that include a significant
construction or interpretation of any law.”194
In Congress, from only three bills the prior year (addressing sunset provisions), the year
following the revelations saw the introduction of 42 bills containing wide-ranging proposals
that included changes to the manner of appointment to the FISC/FISCR and the FISC/FISCR
process, as well as requiring the release of all FISC/FISCR opinions and orders. Congress
ultimately adopted a provision requiring that the Director of National Intelligence in
consultation with the Attorney General publicly reveal any significant construction or
interpretation of the law, including (to the extent consistent with national security), “a
description of the context in which the matter arises and any significant construction or
interpretation of any statute, constitutional provision, or other legal authority relied on” by the
FISC/FISCR.195
Part of the reason for the outcry was that the Court’s decision in regard to telephony
metadata essentially created new law, without undergoing the appropriate democratic
procedures: adversarial debate, open court, and a published opinion. Instead, a handful of
individuals deep in the executive branch, with approval from judges on a secret court, adopted
a sui generis understanding of the statutory law.
Another way in which the structure of clandestine judicial decision-making presents issues
for the legal system is through its impact on constitutional interpretation. In her 2013
memorandum opinion on bulk collection, Judge Claire Egan, citing just one Supreme Court
decision, dispatched any Fourth Amendment concerns.196 She relied entirely on Smith v.
Maryland—a case from the 1970s, when the technologies currently at play were restricted to
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the domain of science fiction.197 The opinion did not even mention First Amendment concerns.
The Court did not provide any detailed legal reasoning based on careful legal argument. Yet
it was binding on future decisions.
When a secret court creates an entirely new doctrine, secrecy is particularly worrisome.
In In re Directives, FISCR looked back at its decision in In re Sealed Case to confirm “the
existence of a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.”198 The Government
was the only party before the court, which made any appeal—either to FISCR or to the
Supreme Court—impossible. Yet the decision became binding precedent.199
When the Snowden documents exploded on the public scene, Congress took steps to “end
secret law.”200 The USA FREEDOM Act required the FISC to appoint at least five amici who
could be asked for comment when any novel questions of law were presented. It also required
that FISC opinions undergo declassification review. However, neither measure adequately
addressed the structural concerns. Amici are not adversarial parties. They serve at the pleasure
of the court and have no formal right of appeal. And despite mandatory review, the executive
still controls what information is, and is not, made public. Yet it is hardly a disinterested
observer where its own interests are concerned.
Yet another way in which secret law operates within the judiciary is to restrict oversight—
not just of the executive, but also the legislature and the judiciary. Ordinary legal procedures
provide insight into how individuals, groups, private entities and public bodies act. Briefs,
motions, memoranda, oral arguments, and final opinions provide tremendous detail on how
the law is being put into practice, as well as on how entities are acting. Once this information
becomes public, citizens have a range of further actions they can take. Where companies are
involved, citizens may take the information that has been generated and decide to boycott their
goods or services. They may pressure their legislators to pass new laws to regulate certain
behavior. This opportunity is lost when the information never reaches the public domain.
Where government actors are involved, citizens have yet more recourse, such as pressuring
officials to fire them, encouraging elected representatives to pass new laws, or, in the
Madisonian solution, voting people out of (or into) office.
Publicly-available judicial opinions yield information about not just government
malfeasance, but the extent to which legislators may be enabling executive branch actions that
adversely impact rights. When the Snowden documents were released, part of the public’s
strong response was directed towards SSCI and HPSCI, who had tacitly allowed the
government to engage in bulk and programmatic collection of citizens’ Internet and telephony
content and metadata. While a few members of the committees had been sounding the siren
197
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for some time, others were immediately seen as culpable in the widespread violation of
Americans’ rights. Senator Dianne Feinstein took to the road to defend her role, for the first
time having to answer to her constituents for her behavior behind closed doors. For
representative democracy to work, citizens need to know how their legislators are acting.
The failure to publish judicial opinions also impacts the public’s ability to perform
oversight of the court itself. This oversight is important in two respects: first, to hold the
judiciary responsible for the manner in which they are performing a check on the other
branches; and, second, to hold the judges responsible for their own actions.
What the forms of secret law in each branch have in common is their profound impact on
the legitimacy of the legal system. In Western jurisprudence, lack of publicity means, at some
level, that the law no longer exists.201 Neither does it carry moral qualities that entail a duty of
obedience. These ideas are far from new. They extend across natural law, the liberal
democratic tradition, and legal positivism. To the extent that secrecy is tolerated in the liberal,
democratic model, it is done so in relation to preservation of the state. National security trumps
the citizens’ right to know to ensure that the state continues to exist. But even here, there are
important limits.
The concept of reason of state and the need of the ruler to control information has long
been part of political discourse. Epitomized by Niccolò Machiavelli, the underlying concept
is that certain actions contribute to a higher good: the existence, stability, and well-being of
political structures.202 Machiavelli’s consequentialist approach excuses transgressions based
on the ends that they achieve.203
In the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero picked up on Machiavelli’s reasoning, defining
arcana imperii as “knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be founded,
preserved and extended.”204 To sustain (and extend) power, discretion and secrecy prove
paramount. Like Machiavelli, Botero saw the management of information, and its constriction,
to be key to political survival.
The problem with hearkening back to the Machiavellian tradition and reason of state as
sufficient to offset public access to the law is grounded in how secrecy functions. Insofar as
deliberative secrecy or even certain forms of information secrecy are at stake, the public may
forgo immediate knowledge. But secret law undermines the liberal, democratic state.
As seventeenth-century English scholars reimagined Magna Carta, an effort was made to
rein in the Crown. Sir Edward Coke, arguing in Parliament for a clause prohibiting arbitrary
arrest and search authorities, explained,
[I]f [imprisonment] be per mandatum domini regis, or “for matter of state”; and then
we are gone, and we are in a worse case than ever. If we agree to this imprisonment
“for matters of state” and “a convenient time,” we shall leave Magna Carta and the
other statutes and make them fruitless, and do what our ancestors would never do.205
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Ultimately, Parliament, and then the people, became the supreme power, giving democratic
institutions more authority.206
Secrecy thus presents a threat as great as, if not even more profound than, the national
security threats being claimed as justification. A terrorist organization may threaten the life
and property of the citizens, but the erection of secret law threatens the very structure of
government. It undermines the moral qualities of the law. And it raises the question of whether
and to what extent obedience is due. Ultimately, what is at stake is the rule of law.
D. Adjudicatory secrecy
For centuries, criminal trials have been presumptively open. The right of the accused and
defendants to have the proceedings witnessed by others derives from common law.207 In the
sixteenth century, Sir Thomas Smith highlighted the role of public trials in De Republica
Anglorum.208 Sir Matthew Hale in his Historia Placitorum Coronæ similarly discussed public
attendance at trial proceedings.209 As Blackstone later explained,
This open examination of witnesses viva voce in the presence of all mankind, is
much more inductive to the clearing up of truth than the private and secret
examination taken down in writing before an officer or his clerk in the
ecclesiastical and all others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law.210
The right operated during colonial times and appeared in the nascent state constitutions prior
to incorporation in the Sixth Amendment.211 Accordingly, in 1948 the Supreme Court was
“unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state,
or municipal court during the history of this country.”212 The Court added, “Nor have we found
any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of
Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in dispute.”213
The Court attributed the guarantee of public trial to the U.S. English common law heritage, as
part of the “ancient institution of jury trial.”214
The right to a public trial protects two types of rights: first, the right of the defendant to
have the proceedings open to public scrutiny; and second, the right of the public to witness the
administration of justice.215 Multiple considerations attach to the defendant’s right. One
relates to pressure on witnesses to tell the truth in front of the community—assumedly either
because the individual would be shunned, or because there might be someone else present who
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would object based on their knowledge of the facts.216 The presence of witnesses can help to
keep the judge and jurors in check.217 There is power that comes with observation—the flip
side of the Panopticon being when the public watches the watchers. As Jeremy Bentham
explained:
[S]uppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on the occasion,
to consist of no more than a single judge—that judge will be at once indolent and
arbitrary; how corrupt soever his inclination may be, it will find no check, at any
rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it. Without publicity, all other checks
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.
Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the
character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as
cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.218
The right of the public to be present similarly reflects a number of important
considerations. Observation is critical for the democratic process. Without insight into the
application of law, voters may remain ignorant as to how officials are acting. No less important
is this knowledge for participation in the political dialogue. Citizens in a similar position to
the defendant also must have access to information that may be of great import to them. The
public, in addition, has the right to be a witness to—and to be participant in—the legal system,
to see that justice is done. This last consideration may carry an emotive quality stemming from
the community’s need to see that justice is done.
Despite the general rule of public access, over time, several exceptions emerged for
limiting access to certain parts of the trial, while still being cognizant of individual and social
rights. By the middle of the twentieth century, judges could exclude observers because of
space limitations.219 If violence threatened the proceedings, the trial judge could take
reasonable steps to secure the facilities.220 Disorderly conduct could lead to members of the
public being removed in the middle of a trial.221 Where witnesses may be emotionally unable
to testify in front of many individuals, the judge could ask members of the public to leave to
ensure that the witness provided evidence.222
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court underscored the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as guarantor of the right of the public and press to attend criminal
trials.223 Two years later, the Supreme Court ruled a mandatory closure rule designed to protect
minors in sexual assault cases unconstitutional.224 The fact that criminal trials had traditionally
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been open to the public mattered, not least because such hearings play a significant role in the
legal process.
E. Quasi-Judicial Executive Functions
The expansion of secret executive branch quasi-judicial functions coincides with the
growth of the administrative state and the post-WWII emphasis on U.S. national security.225
The related clandestine processes impact citizens directly, with little or no recourse provided
for those affected to seek justice in a regular court of law. Like the concerns that accompany
secret law, this category is of particular concern. What is at stake is the usurpation of the
judicial functions of government from Article III, impacting separation of powers. So, too,
does the outcome undermine substantive rights related to life, liberty, property, privacy, and
due process of law. This section focuses on three of the most concerning aspects of secrecy in
this realm: decisions related to targeted killing; liberty restrictions resulting from courts
martial, military commissions, and immigration proceedings; and interference with property.
1. Targeted Killing
The most prominent and concerning development in the clandestine evolution of quasijudicial proceedings are the procedures related to targeted killings. The number of individuals
estimated to have been killed by drone strikes since 2002 is estimated to be in the thousands.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, for instance, has documented more than 14,000
confirmed strikes, estimating the cost in human life as between 8,858 and 16,901 people.226
These numbers include up to 2,200 civilians and 454 children.227 The decision of whom to
target is hidden from public view: the military and CIA maintain top secret lists of high-value
targets eligible for kill or capture. Some of the factors considered are the strength of
intelligence indicating enemy combaant status, whether the individual poses an imminent
threat, and how significant they are in the enemy forces, and whether capture is feasible.228
Decisions to kill or capture enemies are part and parcel of wartime. Three elements,
though, make administrative expansion into this realm and the role that secrecy plays different:
(a) the indefinite nature of the 2001 AUMF as a formal declaration of war (and ambiguity
regarding the populations to whom it applies); (b) the rapidly-expanding concept of
“battlefield”; and (c) the use of kill powers against U.S. citizens.
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The 2001 AUMF authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided” the 9/11 attacks.229 Although not a formal declaration of war, Congress couched the
Joint Resolution as specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the 1973 War
Powers Resolution.230
The language of the resolution has been interpreted broadly to include not only individuals
and organizations who are not part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, but also some
who are actively hostile to these groups.231 Between 2001 and 2016, the President cited his
authorities under the AUMF in support of 37 military operations in 14 different countries—
refusing to specify which groups the statute covered.232 Scholars are divided on the legitimacy
of the rapidly expanding battlefield.233 Some argue the need take the fight to the enemy
(wherever the enemy may be located) and respond to human rights concerns by suggesting
that in a global battlefield, the distinction between war and peace becomes meaningless. In
one of the strongest articles on this topic, Professor Jennifer Daskal proposes a set of binding
standards to limit (and legitimize) the use of targeted killing outside “hot battlefields.”234
In prosecuting its global war, the government maintains that it can place U.S. citizens on
the kill or capture list.235 In 2011, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency killed Anwar
al-Awlaki.236 The placement of al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, on the top secret targeting list only
came to light after a 2014 Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the New York Times
and the ACLU against the DOJ.237 Until that point, the records pertaining to the process via
which U.S. persons could be designated for killing—including who had the authorization to
make such determinations and what evidence was required to support the designation—was
concealed from public view, as were all records pertaining to the legal basis of this process in
domestic, foreign, and international law.238
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When information regarding al-Awlaki’s placement on the kill list was made public, the
justification offered was one of public authority: a well-recognized principle that the
government may engage in activity that is otherwise forbidden to private citizens.239 What
exempted the CIA and DOD from the federal murder statute was their use of such force during
“the lawful conduct of war.”240 The OLC heavily relied on “[h]igh-level government officials”
which had concluded, “on the basis of al-Awlaqi’s activities in Yemen, that al-Awlaqi is a
leader of AQAP whose activities in Yemen pose a ‘continued and imminent threat’ of violence
to United States persons and interests.”241 His citizenship did not make him immune from the
use of force outside U.S. borders.242 The fact that he was located in Yemen, and not anywhere
near “the most active theater of combat” between the United States and al-Qaida, also did not
matter, as AQAP was, if not part of al-Qaida, a co-belligerent with a strong presence in
Yemen.243 Because the threat was continued and imminent, and an operation to capture alAwlaqi infeasible, neither the Fourth Amendment right against seizure nor Fifth Amendment
due process rights prohibited killing him.244
The rapidly-expanding concept of war and what constitutes a battlefield means that
targeting, based on secret information only available to the executive, becomes the avenue for
responding, instead of the state turning to criminal law. The government thereby sidesteps
important protections otherwise meant to restrict the exercise of lethal power.
Capital punishment has long been a feature of the U.S. legal system, but, to the extent that
the ability to take individuals’ lives exists outside of war, it is subject to lengthy judicial
procedures to ensure that those who lose their lives are justly tried. Even then, estimates of the
number of wrongful convictions are distressingly high.245 Since 1973, there have been 159
people exonerated while on death row—despite the procedural protections on capital cases.246
Further rules prevent execution based on age or mental capability and limit pain and suffering.
None of these protections apply to extra-judicial targeting. Added to these concerns is the
nature of the information on which extra-judicial killings are based and how the fog of war
obscures what is actually known. War is notorious for the uncertainty it generates—a situation
referred to in military terms as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (colloquially
referred to as “VUCA”). As Clausewitz observed, “war is the realm of uncertainty; three
quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser
uncertainty.”247
The kill list includes named persons. In 2008, a New York Times article revealed further
use of drone strikes against unnamed individuals, using location and patterns in behavior as
evidence of involvement in al Qaida or the Taliban.248 Also known as Terrorist Attack
Disruption Strikes (TADS), signature strikes amount to decisions to kill unidentified
individuals.249 That includes (potentially) U.S. citizens.
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In November 2002, for example, human intelligence and signals intelligence intercepts
suggested that Abu Ali al-Harithi, believed to be involved in the 2002 USS Cole bombing, was
living in the Marib region of Yemen, near the Saudi Arabia border.250 U.S. forces on the
ground were monitoring him when they saw two SUVs leave the compound.251 The NSA
picked up a call from one of the cars.252 The analyst listening, who had listened numerous
times to tapes of al-Harithi, was convinced that the person on the phone was not him.253
Overhearing someone in the back seat of the car, he immediately identified the background
speaker as al-Harithi.254 He called a second analyst over for another opinion.255 The phone call
lasted all of six seconds, at which point the command was given to fire a Hellfire missile at
the car, killing all six occupants.256 One of them, Ahmed Hijazi (a.k.a. Kemal Derwish), was
an American citizen.257
The manner in which the evidence of al-Harithi’s involvement in al-Qaida was obtained
raises question about its accuracy. Some portion came from Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri—one of
three detainees the CIA had waterboarded.258 The decision to kill al-Harithi depended upon an
analyst overhearing someone in the background on the phone—a rather attenuated
confirmation. It is not clear whether the government knew the identities of the other people it
condemned to die in the same attack—one of whom was an American.259 The attack took place
hundreds of miles from any active hostilities. The effect of the secret operation was to cleave
the judiciary out of the determination of guilt and those Americans killed from any of the
procedural protections and substantive rights otherwise available to them as a Constitutional
matter.
2. Liberty Restrictions: Courts martial, military commissions, and immigration
Another way in which secrecy presents in Article I adjudication relates to restrictions on
the freedom of movement. Military tribunals provide a good example.260 Their use is hardly
an invention of the twenty-first century.261 The Second Continental Congress recognized a role
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for military courts in relation to certain offenses linked to military order.262 In 1776, the
American Articles of War provided for courts-martial over “[a]ll crimes not capital, and all
disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline.”263 In considering the role of secrecy in the conduct of litigation,
two forms of military tribunals are of particular import: courts-martial and military
commissions. In addition, a less formal type of adjudication has existed in regard to detention.
Secrecy plays a unique role in each type of adjudication.
The modern version of military courts-martial stems from the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), which establishes three types of proceedings.264 The most serious are tried by
general courts-martial, in which a military judge presides, with not less than five members (in
cases where the penalty is not capital punishment), or twelve members (in capital cases),
serving as jurors.265 For cases in which the maximum punishment does not exceed twelve
months imprisonment, a special court martial consists of a military judge (or convening
authority if a military judge cannot be detailed) and three or more members.266 Under certain
conditions, and with defense agreement, general and special courts martial can be held by a
single judge.267 A summary court-martial deals with the lowest-level offenses and may not be
employed if the person on trial objects to being tried in such a court.268
The power of courts-martial is steadily expanding. Consistent with their traditional
position, courts-martial have the authority to try current (or former) members of the constituent
service for more than four dozen offenses laid out in the UCMJ.269 Until the 1987 case of
Solorio v. United States, the Court required that the offenses be “service-connected,” and not
ordinary crimes.270 But in Solorio, the Court held that individuals could be tried for any crime
incorporated by Congress into the UCMJ—regardless of whether there was a direct connection
to service in the military.271 Congress has “primary responsibility for the delicate task of
balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military,” which requires deference
in all situations—including those implicating service members’ constitutional rights.272
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In 2006, Congress amended the UCMJ to extend courts-martial jurisdiction beyond
service members and reservists, and individuals subject to the law of war, to include “[i]n time
of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field.”273 In 2012, as Professor Vladeck notes, a lower court controversially held
that this language applied to noncitizen civilian contractors outside the United States, even
though Supreme Court doctrine otherwise rejects the application of military law to civilians.274
The result, and the associated role that secrecy plays in courts martial, carries implications
for which charges are brought (affecting defendant and victim rights); the speed of the trial
(implicating the Eighth Amendment speedy trial provision); the defendant’s ability to mount
a defense (encroaching on client-attorney privilege as well as the ability of the accused to see,
present, or counter evidence and witnesses); procedural protections (e.g., public access and
trial by jury); and rights of appeal.
Another venue in which secrecy operates are military commissions, which focus not on
discipline within the military, but on non-soldiers, such as enemy combatants and civilians in
wartime.275 The most recent iteration stems from the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
aftermath of which President George Bush announced their creation to try “certain noncitizens” suspected of involvement in terrorism.276 The order gave the tribunals jurisdiction
over any offense. It incorporated a wide range of secret information into the trial proceedings,
including:
(i) information classified or classifiable pursuant to [Executive Order 12958];
(ii) information protected by law or rule form unauthorized disclosure; (iii)
information the disclosure of which may endanger the physical safety of
participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; (iv)
information concerning intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or
activities; or (v) information concerning other national security interests.277
That definition extended beyond classified documents to include anything considered a threat
to U.S. national security.
The order authorized the presiding officer (a military judge advocate officer) to take steps
necessary to protect U.S. interests in regard to state secrets and protected information—
including deleting information from documents provided to the accused or to defense
counsel.278 The presiding officer could direct that a summary be provided in lieu of the
information or substitute the data with a statement of the relevant facts that the sensitive
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material would tend to establish.279 Further, the presiding officer could close any portion of
the legal proceedings to prevent sensitive information from being disclosed .280
The rules and procedures adopted by the commissions differed in important other ways
from courts-martial or even ordinary judicial processes. Instead of five or twelve members of
the U.S. armed forces, panels required just three military officers. They allowed for the use of
evidence against an accused without providing access to the information; the potential
admission of hearsay; the use of unsworn testimony and evidence obtained through coercive
interrogation; and limited rights of appellate review.281
The first judicial correction to the overreach came following the February 2004
prosecution of Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national held in Guantánamo Bay, of conspiracy “to
commit . . . offenses triable by military commission.”282 Hamdan contended that conspiracy
was not a violation of the law of war and that the procedures instituted for the commissions
violated the basic tenets of military and international law, “including the principle that a
defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against him.”283 The Supreme Court
ruled in Hamdan’s case that the military commissions could not proceed because the structure
and procedure violated Article 36 of the UCMJ (which requires uniformity of rules with
courts-martial, unless uniformity is impracticable) and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
(which prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”)284 Because the military
commission violated Article 36 of the UCMJ, they were not “regularly constituted.”285 Four
of the justices further concluded that the offense of conspiracy was not an “offens[e] that by .
. . the law of war may be tried by military commissions.”286
Congress responded by passing the 2006 Military Commissions Act, which created a
category of alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the U.S. and
provided for them to be tried by military commission for violations of the law of war, as well
as other offences.287 The statute established the right of the defendant to see evidence arrayed
against him, to be tried before a qualified military judge and a panel of members of the U.S.
services, to obtain evidence, to cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, and to bring
witnesses in his or her defense.288 It allowed the defendant to seek review of the decision.289
At the same time, it limited the right of habeas corpus.290 It narrowed the right to counsel.291
It shifted the burden for hearsay onto the opponent,292 and, while it prohibited the use of
statements obtained through torture, it did not prohibit the use of statements obtained through
279
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coercive interrogation.293 Members of the panel cast secret ballots to determine guilt or
innocence, with only two of the three votes necessary for conviction.
In this context, secrecy functioned to allow information to be obtained under conditions
that significantly departed from judicial norms, undermining not just public perceptions of the
tribunals, but, as a substantive matter, detainees’ rights.294 The commissions also helped to
hide rendition and detention from public view, preventing challenge in civilian courts.295 The
conversation between the three branches continued.
In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the 2006 Military Commissions Act
unconstitutionally suspended detainees’ right to habeas corpus.296 That same year, Hamdan
was tried and convicted by a six-member military commission and sentenced to 5 ½ years’
confinement for providing material support to terrorism.297 Four years later, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia threw out the conviction, in a 3-0 decision, on the grounds
that material support did not count as an international war crime until the 2006 MCA, at which
point Hamdan was in U.S. custody. Judge Brett Kavanaugh noted, “[T]he Executive branch
acknowledges that the international law of war did not—and still does not—identify material
support for terrorism as a war crime.” 298 He explained, “If the government wanted to charge
Hamdan with aiding and abetting terrorism or some other war crime that was sufficiently
rooted in the international law of war at the time of Hamdan’s conduct, it should have done
so.”299 The principle at issue was a simple one: can an individual be held liable for conduct
that is not criminal at the time it occurs? For centuries, legal jurists have responded to this
question with a resounding “no!” Yet secret processes, cloaked from public view, and a
hearing hidden from public access, came to a rather different answer. Just three months after
the D.C. court’s decision, a panel of the D.C. Circuit came to a similar conclusion in regard to
charges of conspiracy and solicitation brought against Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul.
Remarkably, in October 2016, the en banc court overturned the panel’s decision, upholding
his conviction on numerous grounds.300
Congress went on to introduce the 2009 Military Commissions Act, vesting the military
commissions with jurisdiction over “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents” for violations of
the law of war, Articles 104 or 106 of the UCMJ, or any of 32 substantive offences laid out in

293

10 U.S.C. §948r. See also Vladeck.
See Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009) (history of
rendition, expansion post-9/11); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1405 (2008) (rendition previously with aim of bringing individual to trial/not for sending to third party country
for judicial or extra-judicial proceedings); Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution, 28 REV.
LITIG. 479 (2008) (focusing on Maher Arar and the transfer of more than 100 suspected terrorists to countries that
practice torture); William G. Waver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law: “Extraordinary Rendition” and Presidential
Fiat, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 102 (2006) (danger of judicial deference to executive expertise); Jules Lobel,
Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution, 28 REV. LITIG. 479 (2008) (noting that the practice of rendition for
torture violates basic principles of international law); Margaret Saterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007) (arguing that rendition
violates the rule of law); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture
Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) (noting that rendition and torture violate international law).
295 The first case to come forward under the 2007 Manual for Military Commissions (which implemented the
2006 MCA) was that of David Hicks, who pled guilty and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for
providing material support to terrorists. Notably, the system at the time allowed for significant amounts of secret
information to be used against defendants, raising the possibility that secrecy could be used to encourage guilty
pleas—essentially, a second-order effect.
296 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (consolidated with Al Odah v. United States).
297 United States v. Hamdan, Panel Member Instructions, AE 321 (Mil. Comm. Aug. 4, 2008).
298 Hamdan v. U.S., 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
299 Hamdan v. U.S., 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
300 Al Bahlul v. United States, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam), en banc rev. granted and
panel order vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2013) (en banc).
294

39

the MCA.301 It prohibited the use of evidence obtained through torture or cruel and unusual
punishment, and limiting the conditions under which hearsay evidence can be used.302 The law
strengthened the accused’s rights to counsel, so that he or she could request a specific counsel
from the pool of attorneys and, in capital cases, obtain a lawyer with previous experience in
the area. The statute also shifted the burden for the use of hearsay evidence to the party
intending to use it.303
The creation of a separate, secret adjudicatory system further raises the risk that in a world
in which success is determined based on the number of convictions, the executive branch will
engage in a form of forum shopping, preferencing the systems with greater secrecy and fewer
protections for defendants, creating a reinforcing mechanism. In November 2009, for instance,
Attorney General Holder explained that many of the Guantanamo Bay cases “could be
prosecuted in either federal courts or military commissions.”304 As counsel for al-Nashiri
explained, “the military commission system in Guantánamo has become a permanent, civilianadministered adjunct to the judicial system that openly competes for the district courts’
jurisdiction over high profile crimes.”305
The risks posed by secrecy in Article I tribunals extend to immigration. For decades, INS
regulations required that deportation proceedings be presumptively open to the public.306 In
the event that there was not enough space at the facility, the regulations directed that the judge
give the media priority, to ensure that the proceedings be accessible more broadly. 307 Under
certain circumstances (to protect witnesses, parties, or the public interest) the judge could
“limit attendance or hold a closed hearing.”308 The regulations required that the proceedings
be closed to the public in cases involving abuse of an alien spouse and child (unless, in the
former case, the spouse agreed to have the proceedings in open record).309 The presumption
of openness reflected the right to public trial in the criminal realm.310
Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, the DOJ departed from this long-established
practice. At the direction of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy informed all immigration judges that DOJ had implemented “additional
security procedures” for cases of “special interest” to the government.311 Hearings would
henceforward be closed to all members of the public—including family, friends, and the
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media.312 The Attorney General directed that information regarding the cases neither be posted
on the court calendars outside the hearing rooms nor provided in the courts’ telephone services.
Those working at the courthouse were not to discuss the cases of special interest with
anyone—including indicating whether or not the case had been scheduled for a hearing.313 The
Record of Proceeding (the official file with documents related to non-citizens’ immigration
cases) could only be provided to the detainee’s attorney, and then only if it did not contain any
classified information.314
The decision to hide even the existence of the hearings, as well as the proceedings
themselves, was made behind closed doors, without any opportunity for discussion. The DOJ
refused to release the criteria for what constituted a case of special interest, and those whose
cases fell into this category had no opportunity to contest the designation. Within six months,
611 people were subject to secret hearings, approximately two-thirds of whom had been
subject to multiple ones.315
Several lawsuits challenged the hearings on due process and First Amendment grounds.
In Haddad v. Ashcroft, the Eastern District of Michigan considered a case in which an
immigration judge had been forced to close proceedings to the public, including the family
and friends of the individual in custody as well as the media.316 The court ruled that the
government’s closure violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment—a
constitutional protection that extends to “all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence here is unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”317 The court noted
the many cases in which open hearings have been considered fundamental to concepts of
fairness, recognizing that the rights at stake in immigration proceedings are at least as serious
as those at issue in criminal or civil actions, if not more so:.318 In light of the recent attack, it
was especially important to ensure open access to adjudicative processes: “Few could disagree
that the events of September 11 altered the way we view our world and the safety of our nation
. . . we regard our own neighbors with suspicion and go about our day-to-day affairs wary of
our own security.”319 The Court continued, “Traditionally, in such a climate, individuals
(including some in government) are more willing to abridge the constitutional rights of people
who are perceived to share something in common with the ‘enemy,’ either because of their
race, ethnicity, or beliefs.”320 At such times, it was critical to maintain the country’s
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commitment to due process to ensure that the legal system did not arbitrarily invade the rights
of individuals.
Other courts similarly picked up on the importance of open hearings for the rights of the
defendant. In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit noted the importance
of having the public involved to serve “as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial
process to public scrutiny.”321 The Court highlighted the importance of spectators to
discourage perjury, as well as to enhance “the performance of all involved.”322 No less
important were open immigration hearings to the rights of the public. In the same case (North
Jersey Media Group), the Court emphasized the importance of promoting an “informed
discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more complete
understanding of the judicial system.”323 It underscored the importance of promoting “the
public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the
proceedings,” as well as “providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion.”324
In May 2002, the DOJ issued an interim rule, allowing immigration judges to decide which
hearings to close on a case-by-case basis.325 The order expanded the regulations to allow
judges to issue protective orders and to accept documents under seal, to “ensure that sensitive
law enforcement or national security information can be protected against general disclosure,
while still affording full use of the information.”326 Some of the reasons given for needing the
provision were strong, such as the concern that revealing the identity of witnesses might allow
terrorists to threaten the witnesses or their families, with the result that witnesses would not,
in the future, be willing to come forward. But other arguments, such as the need to protect the
rules governing law enforcement investigations were particularly concerning, considering
their spill over affect on the criminal justice system.
3. Interference with Property
Other quasi-judicial processes carried out by the executive, such as rules concerning asset
freezing and forfeiture, deprive individuals of their property. Like targeting and liberty
restrictions, secrecy permeates the structures, giving rise to similar concerns about the invasion
of substantive rights.
Executive Order 13224 empowers the President to place sanctions on individuals. This
power originated from legislation issued by Congress to give the President the flexibility to
respond to foreign state threats. During the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson
established an Office of Alien Property Custodian under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy
Act.327 The statute authorizes the President to appoint an individual as Alien Property
Custodian (APC) to “receive . . . hold . . . administer . . . and account for” “all money and
property in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy.”328 That office
had the authority to seize, to administer, and (under certain conditions) to sell property held
by anyone deemed to be a threat to the war effort. Wilson appointed A. Mitchell Palmer to
head the office. Within a year, the office had amassed hundreds of millions of dollars in private
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property.329 During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt re-constituted the office,
conferring powers from TWEA, as well as the First War Powers Act, 1941, on the APC.330
“Any property, or interest therein, of any foreign country or a national thereof shall vest in the
Alien Property Custodian whenever the Alien Property Custodian shall so direct.”331
Following abuses of the power by the Nixon Administration, Congress withdrew TWEA
and replaced it with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.332 This law focused
on threats outside the country. Once a national emergency is declared, the President can
designate entities considered a threat to national security, freezing their assets and blocking
any trade between them and U.S. persons.333
The President informs Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which
informs banks. The statute includes a criminal penalty for those who refuse to comply. At first,
successive administrations only applied IEEPA to states. But in the 1990s, President Clinton
extended it to include nonstate actors: specifically, Palestinian organizations and the Cali drug
cartel. In January 1995, for the first time, he extended it to individuals (those threatening to
disrupt the Middle East peace processes), and he forbade transferring any funds, goods, or
services to them.334 The annex to the order included a “Specially Designated Terrorist” list,
on which a dozen organizations and eighteen individuals had been placed.335 In 1998,
following the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Osama bin Laden
and a number of his key aides joined them on the SDT list.336
Following 9/11, President Bush issued a new executive order under the IEEPA,
establishing a new “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) list.337 The order blocked
“all property and interests in property” of individuals listed, as well as all persons determined
“to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial
or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the
Annex.”338 As a practical matter, this means that entities who continue to do business with
individuals listed in the order can have their assets frozen.
The process of listing individuals is highly secretive and takes place entirely within the
executive branch. Efforts to challenge such designations have been met with refusal by the
Courts to get involved. What makes these procedures remarkable is that they end up directly
impacting the same rights that are normally addressed through ordinary judicial procedures.
The effect is felt both in terms of rights and in diminishing the role of the judiciary. Even when
cases end up in Court, the willingness of the judiciary to look too deeply into why individuals
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have had their assets frozen turns out to be extremely limited. This is true even in regard to
material support provisions, where criminal penalties are applied.339
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not enough to ask how secrecy presents obstacles to civil and criminal litigation. First,
one must ask how secrecy functions and then determine whether it is beneficial or harmful to
the liberal, democratic state. This chapter has focused on three areas: deliberation, information,
and law and legal processes, positing that the functional purpose of the secrecy, as examined
against how it impacts the structure of the state and the substantive rights of individuals within
it, are critical for understanding the legitimate, and illegitimate use of secrecy in a liberal,
democratic state.
The first category, cloaking discussions from public inspection, has a long history of use.
It may result in better policies, more robust laws, and the fairer administration of justice. The
goal is to reach an optimal outcome. Accordingly, the United States has long protected
legislative, executive, and judicial deliberations. To the extent that the deliberative process is
probative of the meaning of the law, rule, or policy adopted, or probative of the process itself,
however, then the function of secrecy shifts. It morphs into the third category, understanding
of the law and legal processes. Its character changes to a much more insidious form of secrecy.
The second area, information secrecy, carries with it the benefit of protecting against
vulnerabilities. In U.S. history, we have seen two primary ways in which this is accomplished:
through material controls (e.g., classified and controlled unclassified information, and patent
secrecy orders), and restrictions on government employees. Taken too far, actions particularly
in regard to data restriction may prevent individuals wronged from being able to seek justice
in either the civil or the criminal realm. Further damage may be done to the ability of the public
to know what officials are doing and therefore to hold them accountable for their acts.
Of the types of secrecy addressed in this chapter, the third, secret law and legal processes,
give rise to the greatest concern. Static law generated by Congress, working law introduced
by the executive, and interpretive law offered by the courts all come within this domain. For
the latter, secret opinions raise significant concerns related to statutory construction,
constitutional interpretation, and accountability. In all three areas, norms have shifted over the
past seventy years, to increasingly hiding government action particularly in the realm of
national security. Claims of reason of state are insufficient in that the “state” which is being
claimed no longer reflects the most basic principles of liberal democracy. To the extent that
secrecy acts within adjudicatory processes, the greatest impact is felt in the administration of
justice. At one end of the spectrum, cases may be prevented from proceeding. For trials
underway, public exclusion may relieve pressure on the prosecution to mount a strong case
and undermine the defendant’s—as well as the public’s—right to an open trial. Quasi-judicial
executive functions, particularly in regard to targeted killing, liberty restrictions (such as
courts martial, military commissions, and immigration), and interference with property as
manifest through sanctions, provide salient and concerning examples of ways in which secrecy
presents a profound challenge to liberal, democratic considerations. Where secrecy reaches
into the legitimacy of the law and democratic legal systems, it erodes the morality of the law
in ways that have profound consequences for the state. By asking how secrecy functions, a
clearer picture of the purpose to which it is put emerges. This, in turn, elucidates ways in which
it impacts separation of powers between the branches, as well as individual rights within the
state.
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